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Howe: The Implications of Incorporating the Eighth Amendment Prohibitio

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION
ON EXCESSIVE BAIL
Scott W.Howe*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment prohibition on "excessive bail"' is perhaps
the least developed of the criminal clauses in the Bill of Rights.2 The
reasons have nothing to do with a scarcity of complaints about excessive
bail in the trial courts. At any given time, about 500,000 criminally
accused persons languish in jail in the United States,4 and not only
defense lawyers in individual cases, but legal scholars who have studied
the broader spectrum of cases regularly contend that many of these
detentions are unnecessary.' Yet, claims of excessive bail virtually never
receive an airing in the Supreme Court,6 unlike claims, for example,
about unreasonable police invasions of privacy, 7 improper police
interrogations, 8 or cruel and unusual punishments. 9 The Court has not
* Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman
University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The full text of the Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive
Bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Id.
2. Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 468 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment is "one of the least litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights"), amended by Galen v.
Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See Shima Baradaran, The State of PretrialDetention, in 2011 A.B.A. ST. CRIM. JUST.
187, 190 (Myma S. Raeder ed.).
5. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetention and the Right to be Monitored, 123
YALE L.J, 1344, 1351-63 (2014); Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial
Discretion?,A.B.A. CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 17, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/criminal justice magazine/cj sp 1 _bail.authcheckdam.pdf.
6. Galen, 468 F.3d at 569 (noting that the Supreme Court has directly addressed the
Excessive Bail Clause only three times).
7. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (4th ed. 2012).

8.

See generally YALE KAMISAR, ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 222-69 (13th ed.

2012).
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issued an opinion applying the Excessive Bail Clausel° in more than
25 years1 ' and
has rendered only two others in its history, both in the
12
early 1950s.

Much has also happened since the 1960s that invites clarification
about what the provision demands. Technological advances that permit
electronic tracking of persons have reduced the need in many cases for
governments to use bail or detention to help ensure that criminal
defendants reappear at future court proceedings. 3 Proponents of
electronic monitoring contend that the advent of cellular telephone
networks and global positioning satellites make tracking of persons
efficient and effective. 14 Electronic monitoring could raise concerns
about invasions of the privacy of defendants and about the inequality
that would arise if rich defendants could opt out by paying bail. Yet, the
privacy claim weakens if the monitoring is not constant, and it fails if the
alternative is jail. 5 Likewise, the inequality claim collapses if rich
defendants are not allowed to choose bail.' 6 While not a panacea,
monitoring technology should affect the calculus favoring bail as the
best way to promote reappearance for many defendants.17
At the same time, most states have retrenched from the bail reform
movement of the 1960s that favored greater use of release on nonmonetary conditions.' 8 One reason traces to public concerns that erupted
during subsequent crime waves about offenses committed by those on
pretrial release.' 9 In response, most legislatures passed preventive
9.

See MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 12-16 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing

Supreme Court cases applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in prison-condition
cases); Scott W. Howe, The Eighth Amendment as a Warrant Against Undeserved Punishment, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 107-09 (2013) (summarizing Supreme Court cases applying the
punishment clause in non-capital cases). See generally RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2006) (presenting various Supreme

Court cases applying the punishment clause in capital cases).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Salerno was the last case adjudicated. Id.
12. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
13. See Wiseman, supranote 5, at 1364-82.
14. See id. at 1373-74.
15. Seeid. at 1375.
16. See id. at 1380. There is also a potential concem that government use of monitoring for
criminal defendants who would otherwise face bail orders, "will lead to the use of monitoring in
other, more objectionable contexts." Id. at 1376. But, Professor Wiseman notes that there are several
good counter-arguments to such "slippery-slope" contentions. Id. at 1376-81.
17. Id. at 1364. There is a "likelihood of entrenched opposition from the bail industry." Id.
Yet, this practical obstacle should not matter for Eighth Amendment purposes.
18. See John S. Goldkamp, Danger andDetention: A Second Generationof Bail Reform, 76 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15 (1985); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, PretrialDetention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 374 (1990).
19. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 15-16.
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detention statutes and began requiring courts to consider public safety in
deciding between release on non-monetary conditions, bail, or
preventive detention. z Some states also required judges to consider
public safety in determining how much bail to impose. 21 Even for many
defendants not subject to preventive detention, the focus on 22safety
inclined judges away from release and toward higher bail amounts.
Likewise, states began relying more heavily on bail schedules,
which also promoted more detentions.23 Bail schedules provide
standardized bail amounts, typically tied to the highest offense
charged.2 4 The schemes usually involve authorization to law
enforcement officials to release arrestees on bail without the
involvement of a judicial officer.2 5 The perceived benefits are to enable
many arrestees to obtain prompt release and to eliminate some of the
time spent on bail hearings in court.26 Yet, because "judges are reluctant
to reduce bail unless circumstances have changed significantly,, 2 7 the
schedules result in the continuing imposition of unattainable bail
amounts for many defendants who would have gained release if they
initially had received individualized consideration.2 8 For indigents
charged with minor offenses, the "practical effect . is to detain large
numbers of arrestees on relatively low bonds. 29
Whether these developments raise Eighth Amendment concerns
depends on the meaning of the Excessive Bail Clause.Unfortunately, the
outline of its mandate remains elusive in most respects. In what
20. For a summary of state bail laws, see the Pretrial Justice Institute's Matrix of State Bail
Laws [hereinafter Matrix of State Bail Laws], http://www.pretrial.org/download/lawpolicy/Matrix%/o20of%/o2OState%/o2OBail%/2OLaws%/2OApril%/202010.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
When the movement to require consideration of public safety began in the early 1970s, some
viewed the approach as supported by the decision in Carlson v. Landon. See Goldkamp, supranote
18, at 4 n.15. The Carlson opinion concluded that: (1) consistent with the Constitution, Congress
could make bail unavailable at the discretion of the Attorney General for deportable aliens, and (2)
the Attorney General had not acted arbitrarily regarding the particular defendants given evidence of
their Communist beliefs and participation in Communist activities. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 541-44 (1952).
21. See, e.g., CAL, PENAL CODE § 1275(a) (West 2004) (specifying that "public safety" shall
be "the primary consideration" in setting bail).
22. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 n.43
(2008).
23. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 13-14.
24. See id. at 13, 15.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 14, 16-17; see also Karnow, supra note 22, at 14 (noting that "the evidence does
not support the proposition that the severity of the crime has any relationship either to the tendency
to flee or to the likelihood of re-offending").
29. Carlson, supranote 5, at 14.
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circumstances, for example, can a state detain a criminal defendant
without bail? 30 In 1987, in United States v. Salerno,3 1 the Court upheld
preventive detention under the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984,32
underscoring that the clause does not always require bail in the face of
public safety concerns.33 However, the features of the statute and the
federal system that the Justices confronted in Salerno are not ubiquitous,
and the Court did not purport to clarify the minimum requirements that a
state must meet to deny bail. 34 When, if ever, can public-safety concerns
justify a bail amount that would otherwise be excessive? In 1951, in
Stack v. Boyle,35 the Court declared that the Eighth Amendment only
allows bail to assure "the presence of an accused. ' '36 Nonetheless, there
is widespread doubt that this declaration is still the law after Salerno,
given its approval of preventive detention.37 Other basic questions also
remain about the nature of the proportionality test for assessing
excessiveness that the clause demands.38
Another notable ambiguity about the Excessive Bail Clause, until
recently, concerned its incorporation against the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 The Court has never
decided a case that presents the question whether the clause governs the
states through incorporation. 40 However, in dicta, the Court recently
declared the clause incorporated.41 In McDonald v. City of Chicago,42
concerning incorporation of the Second Amendment,43 the Court
included the bail clause in a list of incorporated Bill of Rights
protections. 44 The assertion was odd, not simply because the Court had

30. This article focuses on bail for criminal defendants. There are other circumstances in
which persons in the United States face detention without bail. See generally Adam Klein &
Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice,2 HARV. NAT'L. SEC. J.
85 (2011). I do not address the application of the Eighth Amendment to those circumstances.
31. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, 3156 (2012).
33. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
34. See id. at 750.
35. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
36. Id.at 5.
37. See infra Part B.C.
38. See infra Part 1.
39. See Samuel Wiseman,McDonald's Other Right, 97 VA.L.REv. INBRIEF 23,24 (May30,
2011), availableat http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/mcdonalds-other-right.
40. See id
41. See id,
42. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
43. Id.at 750.
44. Id.at 764 n.12; see also id.at765 n.13 (omitting the Excessive Bail Clause from alist
of
the rights
"not fully
incorporated").
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never decided the question, 45 but because it had provided so little
guidance about the meaning of the Excessive Bail Clause.46
There were grounds to believe the Excessive Bail Clause did not
confer the kind of important safeguard for accused persons that made
sense to incorporate against the states. 47 In Salerno, the Court had
suggested that the clause might not confer a right to bail even in limited
circumstances. 48 The Court also had asserted that, if the legislature
makes certain offenses bailable, the clause might only mean that a
judicial officer must abide by any legislated limitations on the purposes
to be served by bail when determining how much bail to impose. 9 If the
clause only mandates respect for legislative judgment, it would not
appear meant for federal courts to enforce against state judges. The mere
interpretation and enforcement of state bail legislation would seem best
left to state decision-makers.
This Article maintains, however, that incorporation implies that the
Excessive Bail Clause imposes significant limits on government.50 In
McDonald, the Supreme Court emphasized that incorporation is
"selective" among the Bill of Rights provisions,5 and that the
incorporated protection must be "fundamental" to our "scheme of
ordered liberty and system of justice. 5 2 Based on this perspective, Part
II of the Article urges that incorporation of the bail clause implies

45. In other dicta, the Court, many years earlier, had asserted that "[b]ail, of course, is basic to
our system of law.., and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed
to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357, 365 (1971). The Court also later had reiterated this assumption. See Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Several lower courts have concluded that the Excessive Bail Clause
applies against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 211 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming damage award under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of the clause by state actor); Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 71 (3rd Cir. 1981).
Other lower courts have assumed incorporation for the sake of argument but then rejected the
Eighth Amendment claim on other grounds. See, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 2007).
46. See Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365.
47. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-54 (1987).
48. See id. at 752. The Court noted that the Excessive Bail Clause "of course, says nothing
about whether bail shall be available at all." Id.The Court added, "[E]ven if we were to conclude
that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive limitations on the National Legislature's
powers in this area, we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid." Id. at 754.
49. See id. at 754 (upholding preventive detention based on public-safety concerns expressed
in the Act because "[n]othing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government
considerations solely to questions of flight" and excessiveness is determined by comparing the
Government response "against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that
response").
50. See infra Parts I-IV.
51. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-66 (2010).
52. Id. at 764.
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answers to the two basic riddles about the definition of excessive bail
that the Court noted in Salerno.53 First, incorporation should mean that
the clause confers an implicit right to bail for criminal defendants in
broad circumstances.1 4 Second, incorporation should mean that
the clause defines the proper function of bail and, thus, the measure
of excessiveness. 5 Without these basic premises, the clause is unworthy
of incorporation. 6
In Part III, this Article explains why incorporation also calls for the
Court to resolve additional questions about the Excessive Bail Clause
that it otherwise appropriately could avoid. 57 The first issue concerns the
evidence to be weighed in reaching the bail decision.58 Is the defendant
entitled to individualized consideration of various aspects of his
character, record, and crime, or can courts render categorical bail
decisions based on the nature of the charged offense? 59 The second
question concerns the nature of the "fit" test between a bail amount and
the purpose of bail that courts reviewing bail decisions should apply. 60 Is
the test stringent, such as whether the bail amount was essential to serve
the government interest, relaxed, such as whether the bail amount was
arbitrary, or somewhere in the middle? 61 Without incorporation, the
62
Court could probably avoid answering these questions with precision,
because federal bail statutes 63 resolve them in ways that give at least as
64
much protection as the Excessive Bail Clause likely would provide.
However, many state statutes do not confer the same level of protection,
which, given incorporation, raises questions about the nature of the
Eighth Amendment guarantee.65
Finally, Part IV of this Article contends that incorporation also
heightens the importance of confronting problems of justiciability in the
Supreme Court. 66beaso
In part because of the view that claims under the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Parts I.A. 1, l.B. 1.
See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.3.
See discussion infra Part ll.B. 1.
See discussion infra Part IlI.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
See discussion infra Part HI.A.
See discussion infra Part IB.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
See infra text accompanying notes 303-05.
See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part IV.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss4/4

6

Howe: The Implications of Incorporating the Eighth Amendment Prohibitio

2015]

IMPLICA TIONS OFINCORPORATING

1045

Excessive Bail Clause generally become non-justiciable upon
conviction,6 7 the Justices have had relatively few opportunities to
interpret the provision.68 This Article proposes a solution based on
recognition that protection under the clause is not only substantive but
procedural. 69 A procedural injury remains after conviction if an unjust
detention helps produce the conviction.7 ° On this view, the claim could
be raised as a challenge to the conviction, and the remedy should be
reversal. To facilitate and regulate review of such claims, the Court
could adopt a presumption of procedural injury in limited circumstances
while also allowing the government the opportunity to prove
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. This approach would increase
the number of justiciable claims under the Excessive Bail Clause that
reach the Court while foreclosing reversals of convictions where
procedural harm to the defendant is demonstrably absent.
II.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE BAIL CLAUSE AFTER INCORPORATION

In this Part, I argue that incorporation implies answers to two
foundational questions that have long existed about the proper
construction of the Excessive Bail Clause.7 1 First, does the clause confer
a right to bail? 72 And, second, when bail is required, are the permissible
goals of bail defined by a construction of the clause itself?.73 I begin by
summarizing the historical controversy over the answers to these
questions and then discuss the importance of incorporation in resolving
them.74 I contend that the answers to both questions must be "yes" for
the clause to merit incorporation.75 I also contend that the fact of
incorporation suggests that the rights to bail and to non-excessiveness
should be fairly broad, although far from pervasive.76

67. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1982). In an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against a state court judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court held that "Hunt's
constitutional claim to pretrial bail became moot following his convictions in state court." Id. In
White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968), the 9th Circuit held that a claim under the
Excessive Bail Clauseprovides no basis for challenging a conviction.
68. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
69. See discussion infra Part IV.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
71. See discussion infra Part II.A.
72. See discussion infra Part 11.A. 1.
73. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
74. See discussion infra Part IL.A-B.
75. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
76. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
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A. HistoricalUncertaintyAbout Two FoundationalQuestions
The questions of whether there is a constitutional right to bail and
whether the Excessive Bail Clause defines the permissible purposes of
bail both ultimately focus on the proper role of the legislature in
regulating bail. These questions ask whether it is up to the legislature
to decide when to authorize bail and what goals the judicial officer
should pursue in setting bail, or whether the Eighth Amendment
itself imposes limits on both legislatures and judicial officers.
Historically, serious debate has surrounded these issues. 77 As a prelude
to exploring the implications of incorporation, this section explains the
bases for the controversies.78
1. When, if Ever, Is There a Right to Bail?
The nature of any right to bail has long constituted the central
enigma of the Excessive Bail Clause.79 The provision does not explicitly
confer a right to bail, and the relevant events preceding and surrounding
its adoption do not establish that it was originally intended or understood
to create such a right.80 There was no legislative history from the First
Congress revealing an intention to create a right to bail.8' Indeed, the
same Congress that approved the Eighth Amendment in 1789 passed
federal legislation a few days later 82 specifying when bail was
permissible-in all non-capital cases 83-which suggested that the matter

77. See discussion infra Part I.A.1-2.
78. See discussion infra Part II.A.1-2.
79. See Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives,82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 331 (1982).
80. Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionalityof PretrialDetention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1140, 1179
(1972).
81. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of
John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 398 (1970) (noting there was no recorded discussion of the
clause in the First Congress beyond a few comments by one Congressman who declared the text
indecipherable).
82. See Meyer, supra note 80, at 1179.
83. Congress had directed that bail be granted to non-capital defendants arrested for federal
crimes:
And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the
punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a
circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall
exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence,
and of the evidence, and the usages of law.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789). Two years earlier, in the Northwest
Ordinance, Congress also had directed that bail be granted to noncapital defendants. See Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, art. 1l (stating "all persons shall be bailable unless for capital offences, where
the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great").
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was for future Congresses.84 The notion that the legislature should
decide when bail was authorized also coincided with the English view of
the prohibition on excessive bail in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, from
which the Eighth Amendment bail clause was derived. 85
In support of an implicit right to bail, provisions granting such a
right existed in several of the colonial charters and in two of the state
constitutions passed before 1789,86 and almost all states that entered the
union after 1789 guaranteed a right to bail in their constitutions. 87 From
this broader historical perspective, a consensus appears to have88
developed that a right to bail should protect most accused persons.
Moreover, if the Excessive Bail Clause allowed Congress to deny bail
without limit, it would seem out of place among provisions of the Bill of
Rights that have been interpreted "to protect the individual from
governmental oppression," 89 including abuses by Congress.9"
Commentators before the late 1980s disagreed widely over the
extent of any right to bail that the clause conferred. 91 On one side, some
scholars urged that the clause implied a nearly pervasive right to bail.92
On the other side, some scholars urged that the clause implied no
restrictions on the power of Congress to deny bail, although it imposed
some limits on judges in cases made bailable.93 In the middle, some
courts and commentators argued that the clause conferred a limited right
to bail that would not extend to defendants who presented a serious risk
of flight or a substantial danger to the community if released. 94
In United States v. Salerno,95 the Supreme Court repudiated the first
of these three interpretations. 96 The Court upheld preventive detention

84. See, e.g., Meyer, supranote 80, at 1179.
85. See, e.g., William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A HistoricalInquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33,
77 (1977); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1,113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 968
(1965).
86. See Meyer, supra note 80, at 1191; Verrilli, supra note 79, at 351.
87. See Verrilli, supranote 79, at 351.
88. See id. at 351-52.
89. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
90. See Tribe, supranote 81, at 400.
at 399.
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., Duker, supra note 85, at 86; Meyer, supra note 80, at 1179; John N. Mitchell,
Bail Reform and the Constitutionalityof PretrialDetention, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223, 1230 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Verrilli, supra note 79, at 346-49; see also Roman L. Hruska, Preventive
Detention: the Constitution and the Congress, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 36, 68 (1970) (arguing that
bail could be denied under the clause to address public-safety concerns "if the standards and
guidelines of the Congress are carefully drawn").
95. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
96. Id.at 755.
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under the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 97 rejecting the idea that there
is a nearly pervasive right to bail. 98 The Court noted that, in addition to
capital cases, there had long been consensus that "a court may refuse
bail when the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by
intimidating witnesses." 99 Likewise, the Court concluded that the
Bail Reform Act properly required the denial of bail100 for several
crimes beyond the capital context upon a finding that the accused
posed a danger to others that no conditions of release could
adequately eliminate. 01
While rejecting a nearly pervasive right to bail, the Salerno
decision left much uncertainty about when the Excessive Bail Clause
forecloses the denial of bail. 10 2 The federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
allowed preventive detention, according to the Court, for only "the most
serious of crimes,"' 10 3 and there were several protections for the
defendant. 104 He had a right to a prompt adversarial hearing at which he
could testify, present witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses against
him. 0 5 He was entitled to be represented by counsel. 10 6 The facts used to
support a finding against him were to be supported by clear and
convincing evidence' 0 7 and were limited to certain specified
considerations.' 0 8 An order of detention required written findings of fact
and reasons' °9 and was appealable on an expedited basis.' 10 The stringent
time limitations of the federal Speedy Trial Act 1' governed the
maximum length of pretrial detention." 2 Finally, the Bail Reform Act
required that the government hold detainees in a "facility separate, to the
extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, 3156 (2012).
98. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
99. Id. at 753.
100. Id.at 754-55 (holding that "when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not
require release on bail").
101. Id. at 747. The list included "crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is life
imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders." Id.
102. Id. at 752-55.
103. Id.at 747.
104. Id.at751-52.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3142() (2012).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (listing the nature and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of
the evidence, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the danger to the community as
factors to be considered).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
110. 18U.S.C. § 3145(c)(2012).
111. 18U.S.C.§§3161-3174(2012).
112. Id.; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
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held in custody pending appeal." '1 13 While all of these limitations and
protections together sufficed to meet any Eighth Amendment
demands, the Court did not
purport to clarify which, if any, were
4
essential to its conclusion."
Indeed, the Salerno decision did not clarify whether the Excessive
Bail Clause ever conferred a right to bail in the face of legislation
denying it. 115 The Court noted that the clause "says nothing about
whether bail shall be available at all,"' 16 and declined to decide whether
the clause "speaks at all to Congress' power to define the classes of
criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail."''17 Consequently, the
opinion left undisturbed the argument of scholars who urged that the
clause implies no restrictions on the power of Congress to deny bail
altogether. 1 8 Yet, it also did not foreclose the argument that the clause
implies a fairly broad right to bail. 19
2. What Are the Proper Purposes of Bail?
The second major historical puzzle about the Excessive Bail Clause
concerns whether it restricts the purposes for which Congress or a
federal court may require bail and, in that sense, limits bail amounts. In
1951, in Stack v. Boyle, 120 the Supreme Court declared that the clause
only permits bail to assure "the presence of an accused."' 121 However,
after the Court upheld the federal preventive-detention statute in
Salerno, widespread doubts arose that the Stack declaration was still
true. 122 When, if ever, can a federal judicial officer impose a bail amount
that would otherwise be excessive to prevent an accused from, for
example, intimidating a witness, using illicit drugs, committing a
property offense, or committing a crime of violence? The answer has
remained uncertain.

113.

18U.S.C.

§ 3142(i)(2).

114. Also, the Court concluded only that the statute "on its face" did not violate the
Constitution, which meant merely that the petitioner had failed to "establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 & n.3.
115. See id. at 754-55.

116. Id.at 752.
117.
118.
119.

Id.at 754.
See, e.g., authorities cited supra in note 93.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752-55.

120. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
121.
122.

Seeid. at 5.
Some doubt already existed based on the opinion in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524

(1952), which was decided the year after Stack. See supra note 20. However, Salerno added to the
doubt. See, e.g., Karnow, supra note 22, at 8 (noting that, based on Salerno, California passed laws
requiring that public safety be the primary consideration in bail decisions).
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The idea that the amount of bail imposed will influence a released
defendant regarding behaviors other than his reappearance is irrational
unless he will forfeit all or part of the bail for those behaviors.' 23 If the
defendant will only forfeit bail when he does not appear, only bail
designed to keep him incarcerated would seem to prevent him from
engaging in other bad behaviors. Moreover, in many if not all
jurisdictions, defendants typically only forfeit bail for failure to
appear. 124 Yet, if the Eighth Amendment permits the use of bail to
ensure incarceration, the reason to set limits on bail amounts evaporates.
Bail set at slightly over what the defendant could satisfy would serve a
permissible purpose, and bail set at any higher amount, although
unnecessary, would amount to a form of harmless error. This perspective
suggests that the declaration of the Court in Stack, that bail should only
serve to promote reappearance, generally made sense as a way to give
meaning to the provision.125
At the same time, a high bail designed to keep an accused
incarcerated so that he cannot commit more crimes should not always
violate the clause, if we accept the Salerno holding. 126 Suppose that, in
accordance with the federal preventive-detention statute, a federal judge
correctly concludes on the record that a defendant of modest means
should have bail denied altogether. Instead, however, the judge imposes
a bail of two million dollars, which the accused cannot satisfy. The bail
amount is far more than necessary to ensure the defendant's
reappearance, and, based on the Stack declaration, would seem excessive

123. See, e.g., Kamow, supranote 22, at 23.
124. In federal court, Rule 46(0(1) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure provides that the
court "must declare the bail forfeited if a condition of the bond is breached." FED. R. CRIm. P.
46(0(1). However, federal courts commonly have concluded that only conditions actually listed in
the appearance bond, as opposed to all conditions of release, justify forfeiture of the bond, and on
this basis, have rejected forfeiture for the commission of new crimes while on release. See, e.g.,
United States. v. Blankenship, No. l:08-cr-10086-JDB, 2009 WL 3103789, *2 (W. D. Tenn.
Mar. 27, 2009); United States v. Shah, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 2002). Moreover,
Rule 46(0(2) allows the court to set aside the forfeiture for any breach "if the surety later
surrenders" the person, or if "it appears that justice does not require bail forfeiture." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 46(0(2). Federal courts have also used this provision to reject forfeiture after a defendant on
bonded release commits a new crime. See, e.g., Blankenship, 2009 WIL 3103789, at *3. In state
systems, statutes commonly provide for bail forfeiture only for failure to appear. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1305 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.26 (West 2014); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 540.10 (McKinney 2009); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 22.01 (West 2009).
125. The American Bar Association has proposed pretrial release standards that explicitly
reject consideration of public safety in setting bail amounts. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 10-5.3(b) (3rd ed. 2007) (stating that financial conditions of release
should not be set to prevent future criminal conduct during the pretrial period or to protect the safety
of the community or any person).
126. See supratext accompanying notes 95-122.
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under the Eighth Amendment.1 27 Nonetheless, given that the Excessive
Bail Clause would allow the denial of bail to this defendant to protect
public safety, the clause could also comfortably allow an unaffordable
bail amount designed to serve the same end. This hypothetical reveals
that the Stack declaration does not always seem correct.
There are other scenarios involving bail designed to keep the
defendant incarcerated, however, on which the Eighth Amendment
answer is less clear. Assume, for example, that there were no preventivedetention statute, but a federal judge followed all of the limitations and
protections discussed in Salerno in reaching a bail decision. Would a
high bail intended to keep the defendant locked up satisfy the Excessive
Bail Clause? Alternatively, assume that there were no applicable
preventive-detention statute but Congress authorized the federal courts
always to consider public-safety concerns in setting bail amounts, and
without the sort of protections for the defendant that existed in
Salerno.128 Under that regime, would a bail amount designed to keep the
defendant incarcerated to protect public safety pass muster? Finally,
assume that there were no applicable preventive-detention statute and no
legislative authorization to consider public safety in deciding on bail
amounts. If a judge set a bail designed to be above the defendant's
means out of legitimate concern for public safety, would it violate the
Eighth Amendment? The answers to these kinds of questions depend on
the core function of the Excessive Bail Clause, which the Supreme Court
has never clarified.
Whether the Eighth Amendment sometimes itself guarantees bail
should bear on the proper answers to these kinds of questions. If the
clause defines when the government can deny bail, Congress or a federal
judicial officer should not have power effectively to evade those limits
by setting bail amounts designed to keep defendants incarcerated. This
conclusion would mean that, where the clause would require bail, the
test of excessiveness should focus on reappearance alone, unless
behavior other than a failure to reappear spurs bail forfeiture. Otherwise,
as we have seen, the notion of excessiveness disintegrates.129 Likewise,
it would mean that, where the clause would permit a denial of bail, a bail
amount set to keep the defendant incarcerated should not violate the
clause. On the other hand, if the Excessive Bail Clause creates no right
to bail, the provision is simply a directive to federal courts to respect the
separation of powers regarding federal bail legislation. Therefore, a
127. See supratext accompanying notes 120-2 1.
128. California has authorized this approach by statute and in its constitution. See infra notes
185-86 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
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judicial officer should do whatever Congress has directed regarding the
denial of bail and the setting of bail amounts; the Eighth Amendment has
nothing more to say about how to resolve bail questions. 130 The Supreme
Court has not clarified which of these perspectives best describes the
meaning of the clause.
B.

Implicationsof Incorporationfor the Two Core Questions

The dicta from the Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of
Chicago13' declaring the Excessive Bail Clause incorporated 132 should
3
help resolve the two core questions about the meaning of the clause.1
The opportunity to draw this kind of inference-from incorporation to
the meaning of an incorporated provision-is unusual, because the
Supreme Court has not previously declared incorporated a Bill of Rights
provision whose basic function is so unsettled. 134 The uncertainties about
the Excessive Bail Clause concern not minor nuances but core questions
that determine whether the provision has substantial significance or very
little. In this context, even the simple proposition that an incorporated
clause should embody an important right that warrants protection against
state encroachment helps resolve the core questions.
1. The General Significance of Incorporation
Supreme Court decisions reveal that incorporation of a Bill of
Rights protection against the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment carries three messages. 135 First,
incorporation conveys that the protection is viewed as exceptionally
important in protecting liberty or justice by our society. 136 When
incorporating the Second Amendment in McDonald,the Supreme Court
articulated the test as whether a Bill of Rights guarantee "is fundamental

130. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
131.

561 U.S. 742 (2010).

132. Id. at 764 n. 12 (including the Excessive Bail Clause in a list of "incorporated" provisions);
see also id. at 765 n. 13 (omitting the Excessive Bail Clause from a list of the rights "not fully
incorporated").
133. See discussion supra Part l.A.
134. The Court incorporated the Second Amendment in McDonald having clarified more about
what personal rights that amendment guaranteed than it had clarified about the protections provided
by the Excessive Bail Clause. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767-87, 765 n.13. The Court had resolved
that the Second Amendment provided an individual right to bear arms for purposes of self-defense
that was violated by a law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29, 635 (2008). The Court reiterated this view of the Second
Amendment when it incorporated it in McDonald. 561 U.S. at 749-50.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 136-60.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38.
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to our137 scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice."' 138 Amplifying
on this measure, the Court declared that due process embodies "those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions."' 13 9 These statements convey that a
provision should accomplish something especially significant
in the way
140
incorporation.
merit
to
justice
and
liberty
of promoting
Second, the incorporation decisions of the Court convey that the
inclusion of a protection in the Bill of Rights does not make it
"fundamental.', 141 The Court has rejected the idea of total incorporation
of the Bill of Rights.142 While most of the protections in the Bill of Rights
now restrict the states, the Court has considered each provision
individually 143 and has rejected the incorporation of some of them.144 In
McDonald,the Court declared that some provisions among the first eight
amendments also remain unincorporated through lack of decision, 45 and

137. The McDonald Court emphasized that the measure focuses on what is fundamental in our
society, and that we may recognize as fundamental a protection not deemed essential in other
modem, civilized nations. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764. Most European systems, for example, do
not guarantee a right against self-incrimination. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113
(1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). However, the Supreme Court has
incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege against the states. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. Likewise,
even a protection that appears in the Bill of Rights and that adheres in most other countries could be
insufficiently fundamental in our society to warrant incorporation.
138. McDonald,561 U.S. at 764.
139. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)).
140. The test does not require that there be "a 'popular consensus' that the right is
fundamental." McDonald, 561 U.S. at 788-89. The Court has at times considered the extent to
which states honor a particular right in deciding whether to incorporate it. See, e.g., Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949) (noting the "contrariety of views of the States" as a reason to
initially reject incorporation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). Yet, the absence of
popular consensus typically has not stopped incorporation. For example, when the Court
incorporated the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, "one half of the States still
adhere[d] to the common-law non-exclusionary rule, and one, Maryland, retain[ed] the rule as to
felonies." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has also
incorporated a variety of other protections, including the right to bear arms and the right to
appointed counsel in all felony cases, without evidence of popular consensus. See McDonald, 561
U.S. at 750; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (incorporating the right of
defendants in felony cases to appointed counsel).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 142-50.
142. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761-63.
143. In its decision incorporating the Second Amendment, the Court included a list of
protections from the Bill of Rights that it previously had held incorporated. See id. at 764 n.12.
144. The Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury should
not bind the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Likewise, while concluding
that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts in federal criminal cases, the Court has
rejected the incorporation of this right against the states. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410-14 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-63 (1972).
145. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 (listing the Third Amendment protection against the
quartering of soldiers and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines).
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the

Court

also

omitted

mention

of the

Ninth 146

and Tenth 147

Amendments, 48 apparently on the view that they could not plausibly
apply against the states.' 49 This history underscores that a protection is
"fundamental" only because it is especially important in ensuring liberty
or justice, not because it appears in the Bill of Rights. 50
146. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id.
148. The Court has long hinted that it does not contemplate incorporation for these two Bill of
Rights amendments. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (limiting comments
on the possibilities for incorporation to the rights safeguarded by "the first eight Amendments").
149. The core functions of these amendments remain in dispute among legal commentators.
See generally Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modem Ninth
Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L. REv. 351 (1996). The provisions may only
emphasize that the federal government is one of enumerated powers and reserve to the states any
authority not given by the Constitution to the federal government or proscribed by it to the states.
See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947) On that view, by merely
confirming space in unregulated areas for state governments to act, they could not plausibly limit
the states. Similarly, on the view that the Establishment Clause originally was only a limit on
federal congressional interference with state establishments of religion, Justice Thomas has argued,
contrary to existing precedent, that its incorporation makes no sense. See Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-54 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). On the other hand, these
provisions, particularly the Ninth Amendment, may also imply that there are some inalienable rights
held by individuals that do not specifically appear in the Bill of Rights and that limit what
government could otherwise regulate. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Yet, even on this view, incorporation against the states is
unnecessary and cumbersome. Rather than finding a non-enumerated right to arise under the Ninth
or Tenth Amendment and incorporating it against the states through due process, the Court could
simply find the right embodied in due process. The Court long ago began concluding that the notion
of due process makes certain non-enumerated rights, whether procedural or substantive, applicable
against both state and federal governments. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985)
(acknowledging the due process right to examination by psychiatrist when sanity is seriously in
dispute); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (acknowledging the privacy right of a woman to
have an abortion in limited circumstances); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966)
(holding that there exists a due process right to protection from courtroom disruptions and
prejudicial publicity); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that a due process right of a married
couple to use contraception exists); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (holding that
there is a due process right to discovery of exculpatory evidence); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
16-20 (1956) (finding a due process right to transcript on appeal); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954) (holding that there is a due process protection against racial discrimination in the
schools of the District of Columbia); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923) (finding a due
process right against a mob-dominated trial).
150. The incorporation inquiry is not about originalism. There is no basis to believe that the
original understanding of the Due Process Clause contemplated what the Court has accomplished
through incorporation. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 809-13 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Some originalists contend that the Privilegesor Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the first eight amendments against the states. See, e.g., id. at
850 & n.19, 851. From the perspective of original public meaning rather than the intent of the
congressional drafters, this alternative case for incorporation faces serious challenges. See generally
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Third, incorporation means that a Bill of Rights provision will apply
against the states according to the same standards by which it applies
against the federal government. 151 The Court did not always follow this
"identical-application" approach. 152 Before the 1960s, a majority of the
Justices supported a view of due process that might only apply the
"core" of a Bill of Rights provision against the states. 153 For example, the
Court initially held' 5 4 that due process required the appointment of
counsel for certain defendants charged in state prosecutions with the
most serious crimes,' 55 but rejected the claim that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel applied in state court, as it did in federal court, to every
felony prosecution. 56 However, by the 1960s, the Court had abandoned
this view of incorporation' 57 and declared that incorporated Bill ofRights
provisions "are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public
Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009)
(demonstrating that there is little evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause acquired any
generally accepted public meaning regarding incorporation at the time of its adoption); George C.
Thomas H, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment: What Did the American Public Know
About Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 323 (2009) (focusing on newspapers during the
era of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment). Moreover, the Court recently endorsed the originalpublic-meaning form of originalism in constructing the Second Amendment. See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-95 (2008). In any event, the Court has always followed an
incorporation approach that focuses on the Due Process Clause. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758-59.
151. See infra text accompanying note 158.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-56.
153. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-28, 33 (1949) (holding that the "core of the
Fourth Amendment"--meaning "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police"-applied against the states, but not the exclusionary remedy applicable against the federal
government).
154. This view, of course, was later rejected in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42
(1963).
155. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that right to appointed counsel
arises "in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the
like").
156. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62,473 (1942).
157. The one exception to this general rule concerns the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury. The Court has held that, while this provision requires a unanimous jury verdict for a conviction
in federal court, a conviction in state court can rest on a non-unanimous verdict. See Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406, 414 (1972) (holding that a ten to two verdict is permitted); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 358, 365 (1972) (holding that a nine to three verdict is permitted).
However, that outcome was the result of a dispositive concurring opinion by Justice Powell rather
than support by a majority of the Court for a different-standards approach. A majority concluded
that the trial-by-jury right should apply in the same way to the states as it does to the federal
government. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, among the eight,
four believed the right carried no implied right of unanimity and four believed that it did. See
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion); id.at 414-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
concluded that the implied right should only apply in federal court. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 376-77
(Powell, J., concurring).
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Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal
rights against federal encroachment."' 58 The Court recently reaffirmed
this identical-application approach when incorporating the Second
Amendment in McDonald 59 Adherence by the Court to this approach
means that incorporation is improper for a Bill of Rights provision, such
as the Tenth Amendment, that has no plausible application to the
states, even if it could
have some significance when applied against the
16
federal government. 0
2. Reconsidering the Two Core Questions
In light of the usual meaning of incorporation, the decision by the
Court in McDonald to declare the Excessive Bail Clause incorporated
should answer the two core questions regarding the basic function of the
clause: Does it confer a right to bail? And, does it define the purposes of
bail? Incorporation should mean that the clause confers an implicit right
to bail in broad circumstances and that it regulates the permissible
purposes of bail and, thus, the measure of excessiveness. Unless the
clause provides those basic protections, it would not merit incorporation.
The two core questions call for corresponding answers. Each
question ultimately asks about whether the Eighth Amendment limits the
role of the legislature in regulating bail. If the legislature has the
unlimited authority under the Eighth Amendment to decide when bail is
granted, it should also have the authority under the Eighth Amendment
to specify the purposes of bail, although this latter authority would allow
it to legislate high bails-by mandating consideration of public safetydesigned to keep defendants incarcerated.' 6' Recall that ensuring public
safety in setting a bail amount means setting an unattainable bail, at least
when bail forfeiture occurs only for failure to appear. 162 Yet, if the

158. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
159. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 788 (2010) (asserting that a "two-track"
alternative is now impractical).
160. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
161. Apart from the illogic of allowing the legislature to deny everyone bail but not allowing it
to specify the purposes of bail, there is a second reason for why the answers to the two issues should
correspond. If the function of the clause is not simply to ensure the separation of powers on bail
issues, there is no good reason for the Court to articulate an Eighth Amendment right to bail but to
allow inconsistency among states regarding how to judge when bail becomes excessive. In other
contexts, the Court has rejected the notion that the meaning of a Bill of Rights provision changes
from state to state by virtue of differing state legislation. For example, the Court has rejected the
idea that expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment should depend on the laws of
particular states affecting privacy. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 43-44 (1988). Unless
the bail clause is about separation of powers, the arguments for uniform national standards
regarding bail excessiveness would seem as compelling as those for expectations of privacy.
162. See supratext accompanying notes 123-24.
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Eighth Amendment prevents the legislature from denying bail in an
array of cases, the legislature should not be able to direct judicial
officers to consider factors such as public safety in setting bail in those
cases, at least not if bail forfeiture only results from failure to appear.
Bail should only find justification in those circumstances in promoting
the defendant's reappearance.
These two competing views of the Excessive Bail Clause, both left
in play after Salerno, say very different things about the importance of
the clause in promoting liberty and justice. One view renders the clause
insignificant. This view assumes that the Eighth Amendment does not
limit the legislature and only requires that a judicial officer allow bail in
accordance with any directions from the legislature. On that view, the
clause is a mere reminder to judicial officers to honor the separation of
powers on bail questions. The alternative view could make the clause an
especially important safeguard for liberty and justice. This alternative
view assumes that the Eighth Amendment limits the ability of both the
legislature and judicial officers to deny bail or to set bail at a level
designed to exceed the defendant's ability to pay and, thus, to
incarcerate him.
The decision of the Court to incorporate the clause must mean that
it limits both the legislature and judicial officers. Construing the clause
as only a directive to judicial officers to respect the separation of powers
by honoring bail legislation would not only make it insignificant when
applied in federal cases,163 but perverse when applied to the states. In
state cases, this construction would mean that federal courts should
require state judicial officers to honor state bail legislation. Yet, this
view "assumes a separation of functions between legislature and
judiciary" that states generally do not have to employ.1 64 Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit wrote: "[s]o far as federal courts are
concerned, states may apportion governmental powers largely as they
please.' 65 Indeed, on this view, the final arbiters of the meaning of state
bail legislation should still be the state courts, even when the state court
interpretation seems patently erroneous, and the clause should never
have been incorporated, because it provides neither a "fundamental"
protection nor one that would apply in the same way to the states as to
the federal government. 66 To apply such a construction to the states
163. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 556 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that
on the separation-of-powers view, the clause "means just about nothing").
164. See, e.g., United States ex reL Garcia v. O'Grady, 812 F.2d 347, 357 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 357.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
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would be akin to incorporating the Tenth Amendment, 167 which the
Court has viewed as a federalism provision that does not make sense as a
limitation on the states. 168 This incoherence underscores that the decision
to incorporate the Excessive Bail Clause should mean that the altemative
construction is correct. The clause confers a right to bail in some
circumstances and regulates the permissible purposes of bail and, thus,
the measure of excessiveness.
3. The Scope of the Rights To Bail and Non-Excessiveness
The notion that the Excessive Bail Clause embodies fundamental
safeguards 169 also implies that the rights to bail and to non-excessiveness
should apply in reasonably broad fashion rather than in a cramped or
narrow way. The scope of these rights is harder to determine from the
fact of incorporation than their mere existence. However, in general, we
can safely say that a defendant should receive non-excessive bailwhich may sometimes mean release without bail-unless there are no
conditions of release that could reasonably assure his appearance, his
non-interference with the judicial process, and his compliance with the
criminal law. This standard should apply in a way that accommodates
the decision of the Supreme Court in Salerno to allow for preventive
detention in a significant number of cases but that also preserves the
rights to bail and non-excessiveness for most criminal defendants.
Consistent with this standard, two kinds of pre-conditions must
exist to deny a request for non-excessive bail. The first is substantive
and focuses on when the defendant is likely to flee, impede the justice
process, or pose a danger to others. Capital charges can meet the
standard automatically. They have never been thought to carry an Eighth
Amendment right to bail. 170 In other criminal cases, rejection of the
defendant's request probably requires a particularized showing that goes
beyond the nature of the charges against him. The Court in Salerno
noted that, in any criminal case, a showing that the defendant has
intimidated potential witnesses could suffice. 17 ' Likewise, in accordance

167. Similarly, on the view that the Establishment Clause originally was only a limit on federal
congressional interference with state establishments of religion, Justice Thomas has argued,
contrary to existing precedent, that its incorporation makes no sense. See Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
168.

See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.

169. In Salerno, while upholding preventive detention against an Eighth Amendment
challenge, the Court conceded that "the individual's strong interest in liberty" is of a "fundamental
nature." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 755 (1987).
170.

Id. at 753.

171. Id. For an argument supporting this exception to a right to bail, see Shima Baradaran,
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHiO ST. L.J. 723, 763 (2011). Professor Baradaran
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with the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Court approved the detention of
persons charged with certain serious but non-capital crimes on a finding
that they posed a danger to others that no conditions of release could
eliminate. 172 There surely are other circumstances that could also justify
the denial of bail, such as a prior act or history of bail-jumping or of
violating conditions of release. 73 Where precisely is the Eighth
Amendment line? The answer is not clear. 174 There may be additional
circumstances that justify preventive detention, such as a serious75
current charge against a defendant with multiple, serious convictions.1
But, the Court could also plausibly conclude that, apart from cases
involving defendants with prior violations of release conditions, the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and the Salerno opinion revealed the circumstances
required for a court to deny the criminal defendant's request for nonexcessive bail.
The second kind of pre-condition is procedural, and the approval of
the federal statute and related protections for the defendant in Salerno
could also provide Eighth Amendment guidance on that score. The
Salerno Court noted that federal law required, among other things, that
the trial judge find against the defendant by clear and convincing
evidence after an adversarial, evidentiary hearing involving various
protections for the defendant.' 76 The Court did not say that all of these
protections were crucial to its decision to approve the federal preventivedetention system.177 However, if the rights to bail and non-excessiveness
are fundamental, minimum procedural rules should safeguard them, and
the group of Salerno protections, or something very similar, could be the
minimum. This conclusion would mean that, except in a capital case, a
judicial officer would lack authority to order detention or a bond
designed to be unaffordable, even if based on considerations of public
safety, without those protections in place.
The scope of the Eighth Amendment right to non-excessiveness
should track the scope of the Eighth Amendment right to bail. Whenever
the defendant retains an Eighth Amendment right to bail, the nonwrites, "[a]llowing a defendant to threaten witnesses or interfere with the criminal process unfairly
advantages a defendant and does not protect the presumption of innocence." Id.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
173. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 1lb (amended 2007).
174. Perhaps the Court could conclude, for example, that the right to bail also disappears on a
showing that the defendant poses a serious danger to himself if released. However, laws allowing
for civil detention would usually seem to make the denial of bail in such cases unnecessary.
175. See, e.g., id. § 1la (authorizing pretrial detention of a person accused of a non-capital
felony who has two prior convictions for separate felonies).
176. See supratext accompanying notes 104-14.
177. See supratext accompanying note 114.
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excessiveness mandate should also adhere. However, where no Eighth
Amendment right to bail exists, an exorbitant bail should not violate the
Excessive Bail Clause, just as an order denying bail would not violate it.
This conclusion remains true regardless of whether a statute purports to
give the defendant a broader right to bail than the Eighth Amendment.
The caveat is that both the substantive and procedural pre-conditions to
rejection of the defendant's bail claim must exist to conclude that his
Eighth Amendment right to bail does not exist.
Avoiding Eighth Amendment excessiveness requires identifying the
maximum amount needed to reasonably assure the defendant's
reappearance, at least if bond forfeiture typically will only occur for nonappearance. 178 In those circumstances, as we have seen, consideration of
other factors as a basis to increase bail is a ruse for identifying an
amount that the defendant cannot satisfy. 179 A defendant may not have
the means to meet even a non-excessive bail. 180 However, when the
Eighth Amendment requires non-excessiveness, a high bail set through a
procedure designed to keep the defendant incarcerated is, like preventive
detention, improper.
These conclusions mean that, after McDonald, some state bail
systems may regularly infringe on the Excessive Bail Clause.18' Many
states now allow a denial of bail based on public safety concerns, 182 and
some of these systems do not provide the substantive and procedural
protections that the Court approved in Salerno.183 If the Excessive Bail
Clause only required state judges to follow state bail legislation, these
systems would pose no Eighth Amendment problem. While some state
legislatures may have assumed, based on the Salerno opinion, that the
clause required no more, its incorporation should now imply a more
178.
179.
180.
Wilson,
1966).
181.
182.

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
See supratext accompanying notes 123-24.
See, e.g,, Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 661 (9th Cir. 2007); White v.
399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-88.
See Matrix of State Bail Laws, supra note 20.

183. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (2013) (requiring denial of bail based on a
finding that the person poses a "significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to
any property in the community" without specifying procedural protections similar to those present
in Salerno); KY. REV. STAT. § 431.066(2) (2012) (directing denial of bail for an arrestee who is
"likely to be a danger to the public if released," without specifying procedural protections similar to
those that the Salerno Court approved); S.C. CODE § 17-15-10(A) (2014) (permitting added
restrictions in the case of a non-capital offense based on finding that person presents an
"unreasonable danger to the community" if released, without specifying Salerno-like procedures);
VA. CODE § 19.2-120(A)(1) (2014) (mandating denial of bail on finding an "unreasonable danger
to... the public" in a broad range of felony cases without specifying procedural protections similar
to those before the Court in Salerno).
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robust protection. If the clause now confers, as it should, a fairly broad
right to bail, some of these systems may not pass muster.
Many state statutes also call for the consideration of public safety in
setting bail amounts, 84 and some of these directives may also at times
infringe the incorporated bail clause. The California scheme is a
troubling example. Under both the California Constitution and
California legislation, judicial officers considering bail amounts, in cases
where bail is authorized, must make "public safety" and the "safety of
the victim" the "primary considerations.' ' 85 At the same time, California
law provides that bail forfeiture occurs only for failure to appear. 86 As a
result, in many cases, the only way to use bail to assure the public safety
is by imposing a bail amount calculated to be unaffordable, which is like
denying bail. This would not be a problem in cases where no Eighth
Amendment right to bail exists. However, in many of the California
cases, the charges are not, as in Salerno, for "the most serious of
crimes,"' 87 and, in most of them, the bail hearings do not involve all of
the procedural protections for the defendant that were present in
Salerno.'88 Absent these substantive and procedural pre-conditions, the
defendant is not properly divested of his constitutional rights to bail and
to non-excessiveness. In these circumstances, to deny him bail or
deliberately impose unaffordable bail, even to assure public safety,
should infringe the Eighth Amendment.
III.

SECONDARY BAIL RULES AFTER INCORPORATION

In this Part, I explore two additional questions about the Excessive
Bail Clause that the Court probably could have avoided in the absence of

184. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) (requiring that in
"setting, reducing, or denying bail ... public safety shall be the primary consideration"); MICH.
CRtM. P. CODE § 765.6 (2004) (requiring that, "in fixing the amount of the bail," the court "shall
consider and make findings" regarding, among other factors, the "protection of the public"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-11-118(b) (2012) (requiring magistrate to set "the amount of bail" to "reasonably
assure the appearance of the defendant while at the same time protecting the safety of the public").
185. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f)(3); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (requiring that
"public safety shall be the primary consideration").
186. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1305(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015).
187. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
188. For example, California law, unlike under the system approved in Salerno, does not
require the judge to find by "clear and convincing evidence" that an arrestee presents a threat to an
individual or the community if released. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (2012), with CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1270-1270.1(c) (West 2004). Likewise, in some cases, California law, unlike under the
system at issue in Salerno, does not even provide for an adversarial hearing before an upward
departure from the bail schedule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (e) (West Supp. 2015) (permitting
an increase in certain domestic violence cases "without a hearing" based on "an oral or written
declaration of facts" from a "sworn peace officer").
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incorporation, but that it now should resolve. 189 First, in setting bail
amounts, must states satisfy the clause through individualized
consideration or is categorical resolution based largely on the nature of
the charges sufficient? 190 And, second, how demanding is the
proportionality test between a bail amount and ensuring reappearance
that courts reviewing bail decisions should apply? 191 Before
incorporation, the Court had little reason to answer these questions,
because federal bail statutes' 92 resolved them in ways that give at least as
1 93
much protection as the Excessive Bail Clause likely would provide.
However, because many state statutes do not provide the same level of
protection, there will now be more reason for the Court to clarify the
answers. 194 Although the answers are not interrelated, I urge a
solution for each problem that weighs the fundamental importance of the
bail clause in protecting
pretrial liberty against several competing
95
interests of government.'
A. How Much IndividualizationDoes the Clause Require?
After incorporation, an important unresolved question about the
Excessive Bail Clause concerns the evidence that bears on the
determination of bail amounts. Does the clause entitle a defendant to
individualized consideration of various aspects of his character, record,
and crime, or, can courts render categorical decisions based on the
nature of the charged offense? The answer has implications for the use
of bail schedules, which provide standardized bail amounts according to
the charges leveled against the arrestee. 196 Because many state courts,
unlike federal courts, 197 use bail schedules,' 98 incorporation makes the
validity of their use a significant issue. Several lower courts have upheld
the use of bail schedules against Eighth Amendment challenges,
although state courts have sometimes rejected their use under state
constitutions or statutes.' 99 After incorporation, I contend that reliance

189. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
190. See infra Part III.A.
191. See infra Part III.B.
192. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
193. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
195. See infra Part.IV.
196. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 13.
197. In federal court, a statute governs bail decisions and provides for individualized
consideration of a variety of factors regarding the defendant and the charged crimes. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g) (2012).
198. See Carlson, supranote 5, at 14.
199. See, e.g., Fields v. Henry Cnty., 701 F.3d 180, 184 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding judge's
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on bail schedules can infringe the Eighth Amendment. However, I also
contend that states can use bail schedules as long as the defendant has a
prompt opportunity for individualized consideration of additional
evidence that bears on whether he will reappear and the scheduled
amount carries no presumption of correctness.
Bail schedules provide prompt, regularized, and efficient bail
decisions that benefit courts and many defendants.200 In some states, the
legislature creates the schedules.20 1 In some others, like California, each
local court creates one according to legislative direction. °2 In some
jurisdictions, local courts have created bail schedules without legislated
authority.20 3 In bailable cases, the schedules state the amount of bail
required, typically according to the most serious pending charge. 2 4
Courts benefit because they can devote less time to bail hearings and
decisions. 20 5 Arrestees benefit, assuming they have the funds to meet the
bail amount, because they can gain release quickly, often at the police
station or jail, without waiting for a court hearing.20 6 Arrestees also
benefit from a reduced fear that they will face a bail amount set
arbitrarily higher than others charged with the same offenses.
The Eighth Amendment problem with bail schedules is that many
factors beyond those associated with the charges against a defendant
bear on whether he will reappear.20 7 The federal bail statute defines as
relevant, among others, the following factors: "the person's character,
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and

reliance on bond schedule); Terrell v. City of El Paso, 481 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(noting that "exhaustive research" of § 1983 challenges revealed only one case in which a federal
court had held that a bail schedule violated the Eighth Amendment); Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d
1205, 1210 (Haw. 1993) (holding that reliance by a judge on a bail schedule without considering
personal characteristics of defendant was abuse of discretion under the state bail statute); Clark v.
Hall, 53 P.3d 416, 416-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that statute requiring $15,000 bail for
soliciting a prostitute violated due process protections in the Oklahoma Constitution because it did
not allow "an individualized determination to bail").
200. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 14-15.
201. See id.
at 13.
202. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(c) (West 2004).
203. See, e.g., Woods v. City of Mich. City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 276 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting
bail schedule created by local state judge); Pelekai, 861 P.2d at 1207 (noting bail schedule created

by local state court).
204.
205.

See Carlson, supra note 5, at 13-15.
See id. at 14.

206. Id.
207. Karnow, supra note 22, at 14. Encouraging reappearance is the purpose of bail where
forfeiture only occurs for failure to appear. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
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record concerning appearance at court proceedings. 2 °8 Bail schedules
may articulate bail amounts that represent the estimated "standard"
amount that courts would impose on persons charged with those crimes
after individualized consideration.20 9 Yet, because they are at best
predictions about means or medians, they exceed what is needed to
reasonably assure reappearance for many of those persons. We could
appropriately call the amounts excessive in those cases.21 0
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle 211 also gives
ground to argue that too much reliance on bail schedules violates the
Eighth Amendment. 212 The trial judge in Stack had not used a bail
schedule, but he had fixed bond uniformly at $50,000 for each of twelve
communist party members charged with conspiring to advocate the
overthrow of the government by force. 213 The Supreme Court rejected
this decision under the Eighth Amendment, declaring that there was "no
factual showing to justify" it. 21 4 The uniformity of the bail amounts
reflected a failure to follow the "traditional standards" for setting bail
"as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 21 5 Those
standards were "to be applied in each case to each defendant, ' 21 6 and the
apparent failure to do so meant that bail had "not been fixed by proper
methods. 2t 7 The Court also noted that the bail amount was "much
higher than that usually imposed for offenses with like penalties., 218 At
one point, the Court also stated that if "bail in an amount greater than
that usually fixed for serious charges of crimes is required" for any of
the defendants, evidence presented at a hearing should support the
decision. 21 9 Nonetheless, the Court's concern with the uniformity of the
bail among the twelve defendants, and the failure to apply the federal
rule separately to each one suggested that there was an unacceptable risk
of excessiveness in setting even an average bail for a given charge in the

208.
209.
210.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
See Carlson, supranote 5, at 13, 15.
Bail schedules also articulate amounts that will allow many defendants to gain pretrial

freedom without judicial review. Id. at 14. Individualized consideration by judicial officers in some
of these cases might have resulted in a higher bail amount and the imposition of additional
conditions designed to protect public safety. Id. at 16. This problem provides a serious argument

against fixed-bail schedules, although not one grounded in the Eighth Amendment.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

342 U.S. 1(1951).
See infra text accompanying notes 213-19.
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951).
Id. at5.
Id.

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
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absence of individualized consideration. This view conflicts with an
over-reliance by courts on bail schedules.
The incorporation of the bail clause also supports the view from
Stack that bail schedules can violate the Eighth Amendment.2 20
Incorporation means that the rights granted by the clause are
fundamental. 221 As Part II explained, to the extent that the Salerno
opinion hinted that the clause conferred no rights beyond those granted
by legislation, incorporation calls for a different perspective-that the
222
rights to bail and to non-excessiveness are implicit in the clause itself.
On that view, bail schedules, whether created by legislation or by court
rules approved by the legislature, cannot change the contours of those
rights. Schedules are not automatically acceptable. Whether they can
violate the Eighth Amendment depends on whether reliance on them can
promote excessiveness, and the Stack opinion suggests that it can. Thus,
incorporation matters because it undermines any suggestion in Salerno
that the Stack perspective is no longer valid.
The use of bail schedules, however, should not always violate the
Eighth Amendment. For example, a schedule that provides a range of
bail amounts for each crime and requires a decision within the range
based on individualized consideration could satisfy the bail clause,
assuming the ranges for each offense were not too narrow. Such a
schedule might allow for adequate individualized consideration. Yet,
while this approach could help guide judges setting bond, it would not
provide the major benefits of a schedule with fixed amounts, because it
would require a hearing before a judicial officer and the exercise of
judgment as to what bail amount to impose. The result would be delay
between arrest and the hearing, the use of judicial and other litigation
resources by the state, and some arbitrary and discriminatory or, at least,
inconsistent decisions on bail by judicial officers. The major benefits of
bail schedules arise when they include fixed amounts that even police
officials can apply quickly and without the exercise of much discretion.
Although they do not provide for individualized consideration, the
use of schedules with fixed amounts arguably could avoid infringing the
Eighth Amendment in limited circumstances. The first caveat is that
states should have to provide a defendant detained under a bail schedule
with a prompt opportunity for individualized consideration. For a
detained defendant arrested without a warrant, the Supreme Court has
220.
221.
739, 750
nature").
222.

See infra notes accompanying text 221-22.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-40; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
(1987) (acknowledging that the arrestee's "strong interest in liberty" is of a "fundamental
See supra Part H.F.
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required that the state provide a probable cause determination within a
presumptively acceptable period of 48 hours.223 The Court could impose
the same time limitation for the bail-review decision.2 24 The short delay
involved before the hearing would occur whether or not the state used a
bail schedule to allow some defendants to gain their freedom earlier. At
the hearing, the defendant should have counsel, and the judicial officer
should receive relevant information from the defendant and the
prosecutor. A fairly wide array of information about the defendant's
character, record, and crime would properly bear on the amount of any
bail needed to reasonably assure that he would reappear.
The second caveat is that the amount specified in a schedule should
carry no presumption of correctness at the bail-review stage. Currently,
"the amount in the bail schedule typically becomes the automatic sum"
or a sum that courts are reluctant to reduce or eliminate, even after
receiving more information about the defendant.22 5 This practice
assumes a "one size fits all" approach that is patently false. For
individual defendants, the scheduled amounts frequently would have
little if any connection with the amount actually needed to reasonably
assure reappearance. To avoid excessiveness, courts providing bail
review should render a de novo decision based on all the information
2 26
available that bears on whether the defendant would reappear.
The view after incorporation that the Excessive Bail Clause calls for
individualized consideration is hardly revolutionary, particularly given
that some jurisdictions already require it.2 27 This idea also coincides not
only with the Stack opinion but with the holdings of the Court under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause228 regarding sentencing.229
Generally, the punishment clause does not require individualized
consideration at sentencing. 230 However, that is because the Court has
concluded that states generally may impose a criminal sentence to deter
other putative offenders, a purpose that does not hinge on the nuances of
the sentenced offender's character, record, and crime. 23' In the capital
223. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 48, 56-57 (1991).
224. For a good start on the kind of information that would be relevant, see supra text
accompanying note 208, detailing some of the factors listed in the federal bail statute.
225. Carlson, supranote 5, at 14, 16.
226. Some errors of this kind could be harmless, although the prosecution should have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge would have imposed at least an equally high bail amount
after individualized consideration. See infra text accompanying notes 335-36.
227. See supra text accompanying note 215-16.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. VIHI.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 230-34.
230. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 995-96 (1991) (upholding mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine).
231. See id. at 1008 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., & Souter, J., concurring in part and
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sentencing context, where the overriding question is not how best to
deter others but whether the offender deserves the death penalty, 232 the
Court has rejected mandatory death sentencing in favor of individualized
sentencing.233 Likewise, because the issue at the bail stage should focus
on the defendant's reappearance, and the answer depends on various
factors about his character, record, and crime, there is good reason for
individualized consideration.234
B. How Stringent Is the Excessiveness Review Standard?
Another major ambiguity about the Excessive Bail Clause that the
Supreme Court should resolve concerns the stringency of the test to be
used for reviewing bail amounts set by trial courts. After a trial judge
sets a bail of $100,000 in a robbery case, for example, how much
deference is due that decision when a reviewing court decides whether it
is excessive under the Eighth Amendment? While Part II explained why
the inquiry should generally focus on the proportionality between the
bail amount and the reappearance of the defendant, the appellate court
also needs a standard of review. 235 The Court could apply a demanding
test, such as whether, considered de novo, the bond imposed was the
least amount necessary to reasonably assure236 his reappearance in light
of all the feasible alternatives. The court could apply a highly forgiving
measure, such as whether the bond decision was arbitrary and

concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the draconian Michigan sentencing statute might have
some success as a deterrent to drug dealing and the dangers flowing from it); see also id. at 965
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (asserting that "the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee"). For an explanation of why pursuit of general deterrence in sentencing
allows "collectivist" judgments rather than individualized consideration, see Scott W. Howe,
Resolving the Conflict in the CapitalSentencing Cases:A Desert-OrientedTheory of Regulation, 26
GA. L. REV. 323, 341-42 (1992).
232. See Howe, supra note 9, at 102-07 (discussing Supreme Court decisions and commentary
by death-penalty scholars confirming that the function of regulation of capital sentencing under the
Eighth Amendment is to ensure that only murderers who deserve the death penalty receive it).
233. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, C.J.).
234. Even if considerations of public safety were properly part of determining the bail amount,
the focus would not be on deterrence of others, but on deterring the defendant in light of his
personal likelihood of recidivism, a question best answered through individualized consideration.
235. See supraPart II; infra text accompanying notes 235-70.
236. There is another question implicit in this statement of the issue, which is: How sure
should the court be that the amount of bond imposed will cause the defendant to reappear at future
proceedings? The court probably should not expect more than reasonable assurance given that bail
will not guarantee reappearance. Defendants released on bail often still fail to appear, although,
perhaps part of the explanation is that courts fail to set the bond amount sufficiently high. See
THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRETRIAL
RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 7-8 (2007) (noting the number of absconded

defendants who remained in fugitive status after one year, according to the type of release).
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capricious. Or, it could apply a standard that falls in the middle, such as
whether the bail amount was substantially more than necessary to serve
the governmental interest. The language of the clause and its original
history do not reveal the review standard.23 7
The Supreme Court also has not provided clear guidance on this
question.238 In Stack v. Boyle,239 the Court declared that "bail set at a
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated" to ensure the
defendant's future appearance "is 'excessive' under the Eighth
Amendment., 240 This statement could be taken to imply a review
standard of reasonable necessity that gives only modest deference to the
trial court's decision. Alternatively, it could imply one that focuses on
reasonableness without regard to whether other alternatives, also
plausible to ensure reappearance, would clearly impose less burdens.
The Stack Court did not elaborate on the point, and the Court has not
revisited the question in more than six decades.24' Moreover, in applying
mandates against excessive fines and punishments embodied in the other
two clauses in the Eighth Amendment, the Court commonly has asked
whether there was gross disproportionality, a more forgiving standard
than any plausible interpretation of Stack.24 2
Lower courts and commentators are also widely divided over what
review standard should apply under the Excessive Bail Clause.243 Some
have asked whether the bail amount serves a compelling interest of
government. 244 Some have called for a standard involving "intermediate
scrutiny" that asks whether the bail amount was substantially greater
than necessary to achieve the permitted purpose.2 45 Some courts have
used the test applied by the Supreme Court for other Eighth Amendment
clauses, asking whether the bail amount was grossly disproportional in
237. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
238. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1384 (asserting that there is not yet a "clear answer" to
how "excessiveness is to be measured").
239. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
240. Id. at 5.
241. The only two other cases involving the Excessive Bail Clause are Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), neither of which provided an
answer to this riddle. See supra note 20; supra text accompanying notes 95-101; supra text
accompanying notes 10-12.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (interpreting the
Excessive Fines Clause); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause).
243. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 842-43 (1 lthCir. 2009) (declaring that the
test for excessiveness is "whether the terms of release are designed to ensure a compelling interest
of the government").
245. See, e.g., Wiseman, supranote 5, at 1349.
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light of the end to be achieved.24 6 Finally, some have employed a
highly relaxed standard, asking only whether the bail amount was set in
an arbitrary manner.24 7 Especially after endorsing incorporation of
the clause against the states, 248 the Supreme Court should resolve
the conflict.
The incorporation of the clause not only increases the need for the
Court to settle the question but helps to answer it. Incorporation does not
imply a precise standard of review, but it should eliminate at least one
option that some lower courts have pursued. To ask only whether a bail
amount was set in an arbitrary manner is to provide the kind of illusory
protection that would do nothing to prevent bail amounts that are higher
than warranted. The due process mandate would prevent such arbitrary
action even without the existence of the Excessive Bail Clause.2 49 It
would be incongruous "not to subject a deprivation" of a right to nonexcessive bail "to meaningful review under a constitutional provision
designed to protect it."' 250 If the clause were understood only to prevent
arbitrary action, there would have been no good reason to include it in
the Constitution, and the Court should not have declared it incorporated.
Incorporation arguably calls for a demanding de novo review that
asks whether the bond imposed was the least restrictive alternative
among all the feasible options. Some commentators might contend that
incorporation raises federalism concerns, and that enforcement by the
federal courts of the Eighth Amendment against the states should
involve more deference than that involved when federal appellate courts
review decisions by federal trial courts under the federal bail statute.2 '
After all, in addition to the federalism concerns at stake, determining a
bail amount involves not a pure question of law but a mixed question of
law and fact, and answers to mixed questions sometimes warrant
deference from a reviewing court. 2 However, the Supreme Court has
required de novo review of mixed questions where it would serve a lawclarifying function even when the issues would largely come from state
246. See, e.g., Fields v. Henry Cnty., 701 F.3d 180, 184 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bajakajian,524
U.S. at 334) (employing a "grossly disproportional" test).
247. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Garcia v. O'Grady, 812 F.2d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying test of whether the bail amount was set arbitrarily).
248. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750, 765 n.12 (2010).
249. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1390.
250. Id. at 1388.
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
252. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 114 (1985)) (asserting that "deferential review of mixed questions of law and fact is
warranted when it appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than the appellate court to
decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of
legal doctrine").
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cases.25 3 For example, the Court has required de novo review of
determinations of the voluntariness of a confession under the Due
Process Clause25 4 and of the existence of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. 255 These are mixed questions
that arise primarily in state criminal cases. Yet, the Court has
emphasized that the "legal rules" governing them "acquire content only
through application," so that "independent review is . . . necessary if
appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal
principles., 256 These same declarations arguably apply when appellate
courts review the excessiveness of bail decisions. While dependent on
various facts in each case, 257 bail decisions involve patterns that repeat
themselves and lead to generalization. Moreover, to give substantial
deference to state trial court conclusions on bail, would "strip a federal
appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of the law. 258
The extent to which the inquiry should consider alternatives outside
of fairly standard release conditions is a separate problem. 259 This
difficulty concerns what should count as a "feasible alternative[]" in
deciding whether a bond imposed was appropriate. Assume, for
example, that electronic monitoring of pretrial defendants is not yet
authorized and funded in a particular county, although it is available in
some places.26 ° When the trial court imposes a bail of $2000 that the
defendant cannot meet, should the reviewing court evaluate
excessiveness based on the options currently available in the particular
county or those that are feasible in a larger sense? 261 One might contend
that reviewing courts should evaluate only whether the trial judge acted
improperly under the circumstances and options that she actually faced.
However, the better view is that the Eighth Amendment should demand
that local jurisdictions sometimes pursue what is feasible in a larger
sense, recognizing that the reviewing court retains the ability to consider
costs and benefits of approaches that are non-standard in the particular
county.262 Otherwise, a state could limit Eighth Amendment scrutiny and
253. See infra text accompanying notes 254-55.
254. See, e.g., Miller, 474 U.S. at 115-18 (1985) (holding that whether a confession was
voluntary under the due process clause merits de novo review in federal court).
255. See Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
256. Id. at 697 (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 114).
257. For example, consider the number of factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
258. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
259. See infra text accompanying notes 260-64.
260. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1361. Regarding the current use of electronic monitoring of
pretrial defendants in the United States and Europe, see id. at 1364-68.
261. See id. at 1384 (noting that "courts have not yet provided a clear answer" to this question).
262. While the propriety of electronic monitoring of pretrial defendants as a viable option is
beyond the scope of this Article, Professor Samuel Wiseman has argued that it generally should be
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enforcement by declining to fund even basic services that could facilitate
release alternatives to bail.263 And, as we have seen, the Excessive Bail
Clause should control not only courts but legislatures, who may hold the
authorization and funding power for pretrial release agencies. 2 6
There also is no compelling reason for the Court to adopt the highly
forgiving "gross disproportionality" test that it has applied to measure
excessiveness under the punishment and fine clauses of the Eighth
Amendment. 265 The use of that standard for the bail clause might sound
symmetrical, but sentencing decisions differ from bail decisions.2 66
Sentencing decisions can rest on consideration of multiple, competing
goals, including retribution, incapacitation, general deterrence, and
rehabilitation. 267 An effort by the Court to articulate a demanding test of
sentencing proportionality that focuses, for example, only on an
offender's deserts would conflict with its approval of those competing
purposes. In contrast, in other than preventive-detention cases,
determining whether an arrestee should receive bail and, if so, the
268
amount, generally should concern only whether he will reappear.
Given this single overriding purpose, there is less reason to defer to trial
court judgments on bail in the face of an excessiveness claim.269
In the end, the Court could plausibly move to the middle and
impose a standard that asks whether a chosen bail amount is
"substantially more burdensome than necessary" to reasonably assure
the reappearance of the defendant. 270 This "intermediate" level of
scrutiny would demand slightly more accuracy from the state than the
required under the Excessive Bail Clause as an alternative to money bail for relatively low-risk
defendants. See id. at 1368.
263. Consistent with this view, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has declined to
suggest that a local jurisdiction could withhold training of police officers to reduce their knowledge
of what the amendment requires to establish probable cause and thereby expand the coverage of the
exception for reasonable mistakes about probable cause in warrant cases. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984) (declaring that the test assumes a "reasonably well-trained officer").
264. See supra text accompanying notes 265-68.
265. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 267-69.
267. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(asserting that the "Eighth Amendment [Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause] does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory").
268. See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
269. There are other relevant distinctions between sentencing and bail decisions. For example,
while sentencing concerns a substantive right to liberty that stands alone, bail concerns not only the
substance of pretrial freedom, but the process of preparing one's defense. See infra Part IV.B.
Consequently, protection of the non-excessive bail right can have an even greater tendency to
promote justice than protection of the non-excessive punishment and fine rights. Professor Wiseman
writes: "[T]he courts and other parts of the Constitution typically give far less leeway to legislatures
in limiting criminal procedural rights." Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1389.
270. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1350.
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"gross disproportionality" test from criminal sentencing. At the same
time, its use would reflect that bail decisions are modestly more
complicated than decisions about the voluntariness of a confession or the
existence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Although this latter
position seems doubtful, if there are more factors at play in a bail
decision, the law-clarifying powers of close appellate review would
diminish, which favors a modestly more deferential standard than
whether the judge pursued the least restrictive option.
IV.

JUSTICIABILITY OF CLAIMS AFTER INCORPORATION

Incorporation of the Excessive Bail Clause also calls for a remedy
to problems regarding the justiciability of excessive-bail claims in
reviewing courts, particularly the Supreme Court. The common
perception is that these claims generally become non-justiciable upon
conviction, which typically occurs before state prisoners can raise them
in federal court. This perception helps explain why the Supreme Court
has relatively few chances to interpret the clause. Yet, this Part argues
that incorporation warrants a change in the understanding of excessivebail claims both to accurately reflect the nature of the rights involved
and to enable federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court, to
develop the Eighth Amendment doctrine.2 71 I begin by describing the
basis for the view that these claims generally become non-justiciable on
conviction. 272 I then present an alternative view that more accurately
reflects the fundamental rights at stake and makes excessive-bail claims
from state prisoners more often reviewable.273
A.

The View of a Narrow Substantive Right

Although the case law and commentary on this question are sparse,
the common perception apparently is that the Excessive Bail Clause
274
confers at most only a purely substantive right that is quite narrow.
The right is purely substantive because it does not bear on whether the
defendant received a constitutional adjudication of his criminal case.275
271.
272.
273.
274.

See
See
See
See

infra Part TV.
infra Part W.A.
infra Part IV.B.
Wiseman, supra note 5, 1385-86.

275. See, e.g., White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that, even assuming
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment clause, there is no authority that an excessive-bail claim is
a "basis for invalidation of a conviction"); see also Kett v. United States, 722 F.2d 687, 688, 690
(1 th Cir. 1984) (holding that "claims of excessive bail are not cognizable" in an action challenging

a federal conviction for lack of constitutionality); Traber v. United States, 466 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th
Cir. 1972) (holding, in an action challenging a federal conviction for lack of constitutionality, that
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The state can detain an arrestee through his conviction and still properly
conclude that the detention had no legal effect on the validity of the
adjudicative process. 76 Likewise, the substantive right is narrow in that
it exists merely during the limited period of uncertainty about the guilt of
the detainee.27 7 The right is only to be free of incarceration in violation
of the Excessive Bail Clause while presumed innocent of the charges
underlying the detention.27 8
This perspective helps explain why the clause would often not
produce justiciable claims from state-court defendants on review.279
First, if the right is purely substantive, a defendant cannot successfully
claim its infringement in his appeals seeking reversal of his convictions,
whether on direct appeal to the Supreme Court or on collateral attack
under state or federal habeas statutes. 280 This notion that the right is
purely substantive builds on the obviously correct view that pretrial
release is not essential to a constitutional trial. After all, courts can deny
bail altogether in capital cases and in cases where pretrial release would
risk public safety, among others. 28 ' Likewise, some arrestees will
properly remain in jail pending adjudication because they cannot meet
even a non-excessive bail.282 The clause does not guarantee pretrial
release. 283 If pretrial freedom is non-essential to a constitutional trial, it
perhaps is not important even when a court denies it in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. From this perspective, one could plausibly see the
right to non-excessive bail as purely substantive and, thus, not a basis for
challenging a conviction. 284
the issue of an excessive bond "was an issue not appropriately raised").
276. Wilson, 399 F.2d at 598 (noting that "there is no indication" how being held under what
plaintiff considered to be excessive bail "could have affected his conviction").
277. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (noting that "[u]nless the fight to bail before trial
is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its
meaning").
278. See id.
279. See infra text accompanying notes 280-305.
280. See, e.g., Wilson, 399 F.2d at 597-98 (casting doubt that an excessive-bail claim is a
ground for invalidating a conviction).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 170-75.
282. See supra text accompanying note 180.
283. In Salerno, the Court had suggested that the clause might not confer a right to bail even in
limited circumstances. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). The Court noted that
the Excessive Bail Clause "of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all." Id.
The Court added: "[Elven if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some
substantive limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area, we would still hold that the
Bail Reform Act is valid." Id. at 754.
284. But, the argument that that pretrial release of the defendant is not essential to a
constitutional trial does not lead ineluctably to a conclusion that compliance with Eighth
Amendment doctrine should not matter in deciding whether a trial was constitutional. Indeed, I
argue later that pretrial detention in violation of the Eighth Amendment can properly bear on
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A defendant can, of course, challenge his bail amount or pretrial
detention before he is found guilty, but a state court defendant will face
problems getting into federal court under the federal habeas statute for
state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,285 during this period. 286 First, the
defendant will have to exhaust his claim in all of the state trial and
appellate courts.287 In theory, the pretrial defendant who loses after
appeal to the state supreme court could pursue relief under the Eighth
Amendment through a federal habeas claim. However, litigating the bail
issues through the state trial and appellate courts will take time. Pursuing
them further in federal court will take additional time. The bail litigation
will also require resources that the defendant could direct at defending
against the criminal charges. Moreover, almost all state court criminal
defendants are indigent and have appointed counsel, who might not see
their authorized representation to include litigating bail claims in federal
court.2 88 Moreover, the review-restraining standards in the federal
habeas statute make gaining reversal of a state court ruling on
appropriate bail difficult. 289 Most state court defendants will plead guilty
or focus on preparing for trial rather than pursue pretrial claims of
excessive bail in federal court.290
After conviction, a state court defendant who believes the state
detained him on excessive bail or improperly denied him bail will also
rarely have a claim in federal court for money damages or equitable
relief under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.291 As for
money damages, the state and its "alter ego" will have absolute
immunity, 292 as will the judge who set or denied the bail, 293 or a police
whether the subsequent adjudication was constitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 306-13.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
286. See infra text accompanying notes 287-90.
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 847
(1999) (declaring that "[b]efore a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the
prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court" and announcing a rule "requiring state prisoners
to file petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review
procedure in the State").
288. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2005, at 31, 31; see THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT NAT'L
RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., DON'T I NEED A LAWYER?: PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO

COUNSEL 26 (2015), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/RTC-DINAL 3.18.15.pdf.
289. The statute forbids reversal of a state court decision unless it "was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or... was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2).
290.

See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 288, at

12.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see infra text and accompanying notes 292-302.
292. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1889) (holding "sovereign States[s]" exempt
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officer who set bail in accordance with a state statute.294 State legislators
will have immunity when they "act legislatively within a 'traditional
legislative capacity.' 295 The prosecutor who argued for the bail will also
have immunity.2 96 Any police officer who may have recommended an
excessive bail amount will be immune as long as he acted in objective
good faith.297 A municipality or county will also not face liability, absent
evidence that it had a policy or customary practice in favor of excessive
bail.298 In the end, the defendant claiming excessive bail will usually
have no person or entity to successfully sue for damages. As for
299
equitable relief, in addition to the many immunities that would apply,
conviction would render any claims by the defendant for an injunction or
a declaratory judgment non-justiciable 30°0 because his pretrial right under
the Eighth Amendment would no longer apply, 30 1 and there would be no
"from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of individuals"); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, 3 CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, at 9-207 (4th ed. 2014).

293. E.g., Lane v. Jenkins, No. 10-2149, 2011 WL 6425314, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011);
see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (stating that "[flew doctrines were more solidly
established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction"); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, 2 CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, at 7-4 (4th ed. 2014).

294. See, e.g., Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that police officers in
this context serve a judicial function and, therefore, have absolute immunity).
295. See Supreme Court ofVa. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732-34 (1980) (citing
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)); NA-MOD,supra note 293, at 7-4.
296. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976); NAHMOD, supra note 293, at 7-3 to
7-4; see, e.g., Lane, 2011 WL 6425314, at *2.
297. See, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 665-66 (9th Cir. 2007).
298. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978);
Galen, 477 F.3d at 667-68.
299. For example, the state and its "alter ego" entities would enjoy absolute immunity even
from a claim for equitable relief. See NAHMOD, supra note 292, at 9-207.
300. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1982) (noting that a claim to bail becomes moot
once convicted because "even a favorable decision ... would not have entitled [plaintiff] to bail").
There is a very narrow method by which a plaintiff in a specific kind of excessive-bail case could
pursue injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 to benefit others, but it would not work often.
Assume that a plaintiff filed a class-action suit for an excessive-bail violation alleging, for example,
adherence, in all the cases, to tn improper bail schedule; filed the complaint before his conviction;
and, eventually obtained class certification. Federal courts would retain the power to decide the case
even after the conviction rendered his claim moot. See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 47-49, 51-52 (1991) (involving failure of county to provide prompt determinations of
probable cause for those arrested without warrants). The Supreme Court has held that "the
termination of a class representative's claim does not moot the claims of the unnamed members of
the class." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.Il (1975) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
399-401 (1975)). Under the "relation back" doctrine, the federal courts could retain power to
resolve the case even if certification of the class occurred after the claims of the named plaintiff
became moot. See, e.g., Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n. 1 (1978). However, this approach
would not work even in theory, unless the county was employing a practice that applied across a
class of cases to set bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
301. The Eighth Amendment right is apparently inapplicable to post-conviction bail pending

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1039

"reasonable expectation" or "demonstrated probability" that he would
face detention based on excessive bail in the future. °2
If we accept the view of the right to non-excessive bail as purely
substantive, few constitutional claims of excessive bail from state court
defendants could reach the Supreme Court. The dearth of state cases
would leave the Court with little opportunity to develop the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment clause and enforce it. While claims of excessive
bail from federal defendants could more easily reach the Court,303 the
Justices usually would properly avoid the constitutional questions in
those cases; federal bail statutes, 3°4 unlike some state systems, give at
least as much protection as the Excessive Bail Clause generally would
provide. 3°5 The general non-justiciability of excessive-bail claims is
anomalous for a provision that the Court went out of its way to
incorporate. The clause purportedly protects rights of fundamental
importance in ensuring liberty and justice, but the absence of
opportunities for the Court to construct and administer it largely neuters
the protections.
B. Acknowledging the ProceduralAspect of the Right
The incongruity of understanding the right to non-excessive bail as
purely substantive highlights the importance of conceptualizing it in a
different way. The need is both to acknowledge the full significance of
pretrial release for defendants and to make more claims brought under
the clause justiciable in the Supreme Court. I contend that the solution
appeal, although statutes may sometimes confer a right to bail in those circumstances. See Hudson
v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 284-89 (1895). Yet, even were the Eighth Amendment to guarantee a right
to bail on appeal, it would likely not be on the same terms as at the pretrial stage.
302. See Murphy, 455 U.S. at 482 (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975));
see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 111 (1983) (rejecting claim under § 1983,
noting that "absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be [subjected to a chokehold by police,
plaintiff] is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles").
303. This is true, at least during the pretrial stage while the defendant enjoys the presumption
of innocence, simply because the federal defendant may directly appeal to the federal appellate
courts an order denying a motion to reduce bail as a "final decision" of the District Court. See Stack
v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
304. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
305. The issues presented in this Article as arising under the Eighth Amendment in state-court
cases will not generally arise in federal cases. The Supreme Court already has resolved in the
Salerno decision that the federal statute properly permits preventive-detention in certain
circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101. The federal statute does not call for the
consideration of public safety in the setting of bail amounts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The federal
statute does not contemplate reliance on bail schedules. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Further, during the
pretrial stages, the federal appellate courts could easily interpret the federal statute, in accordance
with the Stack decision, to call for a review standard of reasonable necessity that gives only modest
deference to the trial court's bail decision. See supra text accompnying notes 240-41.
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centers on recognizing the right as both substantive and procedural. The
bail clause is important for defendants, not only to protect their freedom
while the law presumes them innocent, but to assist them in receiving a
fair adjudication of the charges.
This view of the right as procedural means that defendants could
sometimes successfully raise claims of excessive bail to challenge their
convictions. The challenges would assert that their pretrial detention in
violation of the clause constitutionally undermined the adjudicative
process. Convicted defendants could raise these claims on direct appeal
in state collateral filings and in federal habeas petitions. At the end of
each stage, the convicted person could petition the United States
Supreme Court for a grant of certiorari. The Justices would have
discretion whether to grant these petitions. Nonetheless, the Court would
have more opportunities to examine bail claims than it has under a
regime in which courts view the claims as purely substantive.
Does the right to non-excessive bail affect the adjudicative process?
Commentators have acknowledged, with little dissent, that pretrial
release can help the accused prepare for trial.3 °6 Professor Wiseman
notes that "[t]he difficulty of preparing an adequate defense makes the
likelihood of success at trial much lower for pretrial detainees than for
those who have secured release and have avoided the stigma of a prison
cell. 3 °7 Detainees have more problems meeting with their lawyers and
helping them find witnesses and evidence.30 8 The defendant cannot meet
at the lawyer's office, requiring the lawyer to travel to the jail. In
addition to this basic deterrent to interaction, the state may detain the
defendant a substantial distance away309 and, if not, limited visiting
hours may further impede lawyer visits. 3 '0 Detainees must also try from
jail to "recruit friends or family members to collect evidence and
witnesses,''3i1 which can be difficult and, even when the recruitment
effort succeeds, may not produce the same results as if the defendant
were able to pursue those tasks personally. Indeed, many empirical

306. The Vera Foundation conducted a famous early study in the mid-1960s, the Manhattan
Bail Project, that revealed that persons held pretrial were more likely than those released pretrial to
face conviction and prison, regardless of their prior record. See Anne Rankin, The Effect ofPretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 641, 647-48 (1964).
307. Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1356.
308. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV.
2463, 2493 (2004); see also Tribe, supra note 81, at 383 (asserting that the burdens of pretrial
detention include "the diminished ability to prepare one's defense").
" The Causes and the
309. See, e.g.,
Douglas J. Klein, Note, The Pretrial Detention "Crisis:
Cure, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 281, 294 & n.71 (1997).
310. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1355-56.
311. Seeid.at 1355.
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studies, while controlling for various relevant factors, establish that the
longer a defendant experiences pretrial detention, the more likely his
conviction.31 2 This outcome seems intuitive, and even the Supreme
Court in the Stack case acknowledged it as reality, suggesting that the
right to non-excessive bail was both procedural and substantive: "This
traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of
punishment prior to conviction. 3 13
To recognize a procedural aspect to the Eighth Amendment
protection is not to claim that there is always a right to pretrial release.
The state can still hold some defendants without bail and others where
the bail is unaffordable but not excessive.31 4 The authority of the state to
detain persons pretrial does not necessarily conflict with the view that
holding them can impair their defense. 315 The explanation for sometimes
permitting pretrial detention need not deny that there is a potential
impairment of the defense, just as it need not deny there is an
impairment of the defendant's substantive liberty interest. Instead, the
justification for pretrial detention is simply that a competing government
interest-usually public safety or reappearance of the defendantoutweighs both the procedural and substantive concerns. Yet, when the
competing government interest does not apply, the procedural and
substantive aspects of the right warrant protection.
A violation of the bail clause also does not necessarily mean, as a
factual matter, that the fairness of the adjudicative process was impaired.
Some criminal defendants face only a short period of improper detention
before gaining pretrial release, and in other cases, the Eighth
Amendment violation might not affect the trial outcome. For example,
some defendants held improperly have no plausible defense and, even if
released pretrial, almost surely would still have faced conviction.
Likewise, some defendants held illegally could not have afforded even
non-excessive bail and, thus, would have remained detained even if there
had been no bail-clause violation. Further, some defendants detained
unconstitutionally are so irresponsible or low-functioning that, even if
released, they would have done nothing to help prepare their defense and
actually would have been harder for their lawyers to find and consult
with than they were while in jail.
312. See Jeffrey Mans, Liberty Takings: A Frameworkfor CompensatingPretrialDetainees,
26 CARDOzo L. REv. 1947, 1972-73 & n.129 (2005).
313. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895)).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101; supra note 180 and accompanying text.
315. This conclusion bears on earlier discussion in this Part. See supra note 284 and
accompanying text.
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In light of these possibilities for harmlessness, the difficulty in
giving life to the procedural right lies in resolving how to allocate the
burden of proving whether or not a bail-clause violation prejudiced the
adjudicative process. Only defendants who actually face pretrial
detention and who also are convicted should have such a claim.
Moreover, the group becomes substantially smaller if a defendant who
pleads guilty waives any challenge to his conviction based on his
unconstitutional pretrial detention. Rejecting claims from those who
plead guilty involves a major concession, because pretrial detention
influences some defendants to accept plea bargains that they otherwise
would not accept,31 6 and the explanation may have something to do with
the anticipation of adjudicative prejudice caused by the detention.1 7 Yet,
the explanation likely has much more to do in the vast majority of cases
with the sentencing credit that defendants receive for pretrial
detention.318 The credit can reduce the disincentive to accept a plea
bargain, which is arguably a more innocuous explanation since it does
not relate to the ability of the detainee to receive a fair trial.319 On this
view, there is nothing odd in following the standard rule 320 that a
bargained guilty plea generally requires the defendant to give up his
challenges to the conviction.32 1
316. See Bibas, supra note 308, at 2491-93 (explaining how pretrial detention produces
incentives for plea bargains); Manns, supra note 312, at 1947-48 (asserting that "pretrial detention
creates tremendous pressure for guilty pleas").
317. See Wiseman, supranote 5, at 1356 (noting the "stigma of a prison cell").
318. See Maims, supra note 312, at 1951 & n.18 (noting that "[t]he most common form of
compensation" for pretrial detainees "is a set-off of time served in detention against criminal
sentences"); cf Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2117, 2123 (1998) (noting that the period of pretrial detention may exceed the sentence that
would result from a guilty plea).
319. This explanation is not always innocuous. For defendants who are not guilty of the
charges or the more serious charges against them, for example, pretrial detention can still produce
"great incentives to plea bargain to end or minimize the detention." Manns, supranote 312, at 1951.
Especially for those kinds of cases, Professor Manns has urged that legislation should provide a
system of monetary compensation to the detained defendants. See id. at 1996-97.
320. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (asserting that after a guilty plea, a
criminal defendant generally may not "raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea").
321. Id. Could violation of the rights to bail and non-excessiveness also bear on the sentence
received in a guilty-plea case? An affirmative answer might cause one to question whether there
should be an opportunity to challenge the sentence based on a bail-clause violation in guilty-plea
cases. But, courts should disallow the challenge as long as a bail-clause violation provides no basis
to challenge the guilty-plea itself. In some plea-bargained cases, the parties will frequently agree on
the sentence as part of the deal. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 291 F.R.D. 85, 86 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(noting that Rule I1(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "allows the Government
and a defendant to enter into a plea agreement that provides for a specific sentence"). In other pleabargained cases, the parties will at least agree on the charge or charges to which the defendant pled
guilty, and, in such cases, a neutral agency, such as a probation department, generally prepares a
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For trial-conviction cases involving defendants who faced
unconstitutional detention, the substantial possibilities for procedural
harmlessness weigh against applying a rule of automatic reversal,
according to the Court's decisions regarding most other kinds of
constitutional errors.322 In a departure from this approach in the Batson
cases, involving the improper excusal of a juror based on race or gender,
the Court has ordered reversal on direct appeal without proof of harm to
the adjudicative process.323 The possibility that the outcome of the trial
324
would have changed in such cases is minimal according to the Court.

Therefore, the explanation for applying the rule of automatic reversal in
Batson cases cannot rest on the likelihood of prejudice. An alternative
explanation is that "without the remedy of reversal, the Court's strong
words about the egregiousness of race-based peremptories might be
dismissed as merely idealistic or hortatory. ,325 Yet, statistical studies and
the views of many commentators indicate that there is much more than a
minimal potential for an excessive-bail violation to prejudice a trial,
sentencing report for the court. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar-lbarra, 740 F.3d 587, 590-91
(1 1th Cir. 2014) (rejecting defendant's challenge to sentence after pleading guilty to agreed-upon
charges where defendant did not timely object to presentence report prepared by probation officer
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also FED. R. CRAM. P.
1 l(c)(1)(A) (declaring that, in return for a guilty plea "to a charged offense or a lesser or related
offense," a plea agreement "may specify that an attorney for the government will ... not bring, or
will move to dismiss, other charges"). Therefore, the post-guilty-plea release of the defendant may
not, generally, be as important to the determination of the sentence as pre-adjudication release can
be to the determination of guilt or innocence at trial. In any event, once the defendant pleads guilty,
the law no longer presumes him innocent, which affects his Eighth Amendment rights going
forward. See, e.g., United States v. Deitz, 629 F. Supp. 655, 656 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that,
after guilty plea, defendants no longer "enjoyed the presumption of innocence").
322. The Court has stated that it will impose a per se presumption of prejudice only for certain
constitutional violations where prejudice seems "so likely" that "the cost of litigating their effect" in
case-by-case inquiry is "unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). One
example, according to the Court, is the actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel. See
id. at 659 & n.25. The Court also has asserted that such denial-of-counsel cases "involve
impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because
the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent." See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
323. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83, 96, 100 (1986); see also Barbara Allen
Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CtN. L. REv. 1139,
1158 (1993) (explaining that, while the Court has not mandated automatic reversal for Batson
violations in habeas corpus, it "does not demand proof of harm to the jury's decision-making
process before reversing judgments on the direct appeal of Batson cases").
324. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (asserting that "a person's race" has nothing to do with
"qualifications and ability to impartially consider evidence presented at trial"); see also Eric L.
Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96 (1996) (asserting that "the Court has firmly rejected the idea that
a juror's race or gender has any bearing on how that juror will view the evidence in a case or vote
on the question of guilt or innocence").
325. Babcock, supra note 323, at 1158.
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which may be reason enough, however ironic, to distinguish excessivebail claims from Batson claims.326 The more conventional view
may apply: because there is a substantial possibility of procedural
harmlessness from a bail-clause violation, a rule of automatic reversal
should not adhere.
At the same time, the concern that animated the Court's approach in
Batson suggests why the burden should not fall on the defendant
claiming a bail-clause violation to prove procedural prejudice. Individual
defendants may rarely have the ability after their conviction to muster
much evidence of how their pretrial release would have changed the trial
outcome. They generally will have trouble establishing what they would
have done differently in the way of trial preparation on release. The
reviewing court will generally also find it "difficult to measure the
precise effect on the defense" 327 of assertions as to how the preparation
would have differed. 328 A defendant would rarely have the proof to
establish "a reasonable probability" that, but for his illegal detention, the
outcome would have changed, which is the test applicable in cases of
ineffective assistance of counsel.329 Yet, if courts would almost always
reject a conclusion of prejudice, a problem similar to that which could
have existed in the Batson cases would arise. 330 The rare exhortations
that might come from the Court about the importance of honoring the
bail clause could appear "merely idealistic or hortatory. '' 331 This
outcome would hardly honor as "fundamental" a safeguard that the
Court went out of its way to incorporate in McDonald.332

326. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
327. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
328. Cf id. at 693-96 (discussing the difficulty involved in a counsel-error claim, noting that
"[s]ome of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that
were affected will have been affected in different ways").
329. See id. at 694; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (noting that the
test of materiality for failure of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence should also focus
on whether, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, there is "reasonable probability" of a
different outcome).
330. Application of the "reasonable probability" standard in cases like Washington and Bagley
is also more justified than it would be in cases involving excessive bail. For cases of ineffective
assistance, the state is not at fault in the same direct way that it is at fault for a decision of a state
actor imposing excessive bail. Likewise, in cases involving the failure to disclose potentially helpful
evidence to the defense, unlike for excessive-bail claims, the constitutional requirement itself
focuses on trial faimess, and there must be room in the standard to acknowledge that prosecutors
will frequently have difficulty deciding what is exculpatory. In the excessive-bail context, the
corresponding room for error by judges setting bail comes in both limiting violations to bail
amounts that are substantially more burdensome than necessary, see supratext accompanying note
270, and, in addition, applying a harmless error test. See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
331. Babcock, supra note 323, at 1158.
332. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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The best approach would presume procedural prejudice from
unconstitutional detention in a trial-conviction case but allow the
prosecution the opportunity to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable
333 this is the standard response
doubt. Under Chapman v. California,
to
334
decisions of the trial court that violate the Constitution. Placing the
burden on the government to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt would incentivize state judges and prosecutors to honor the
Excessive Bail Clause. At the same time, this approach would foreclose
reversals of convictions where procedural harm to the defendant is
demonstrably absent.
The state surely could make the harmlessness showing in some
cases. For example, the defendant might have faced improper detention
for only a few weeks and have gained release well before trial. Likewise,
the defendant might clearly have lacked the resources to meet even a
non-excessive bail. Further, the evidence of the guilt of the defendant
might have been overwhelming and the proof that his release could have
changed the outcome nonexistent. Where the Eighth Amendment
violation was from over-reliance on a bail schedule, 335 a showing of
harmlessness might also rest on proof that the judge would have
imposed at least as high a bail amount after individualized consideration.
Acknowledging the procedural aspect of the right and allocating the
burden of proving harmlessness to the state would also enable the
Supreme Court to do much more than it has in the past to develop the
constitutional law of excessive bail. Most importantly, the losing party
on an Eighth Amendment bail claim in the highest state court on direct
appeal could immediately petition the high court for certiorari. Many
criminal defendants, despite their lack of counsel at this stage, could use
the pleadings and rulings from the state court litigation to present their
bail claims in certiorari pleadings. 336 The complicated review-restraining
doctrines in federal habeas law 337 would not apply. Application of the
stringent Chapman harmless error standard would also mean that many
petitions would present the Court with the merits of the bail claim. From
the petitions presented, the Justices would have many more opportunities
than they currently do to explain the meaning of the first clause in the
Eighth Amendment.

333. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
334. See id. at 24 (holding that, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").
335. See supra Part HI.A.
336. The Supreme Court has never required states to provide counsel for criminal defendants
beyond appeals of right in the state systems. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-19 (1974).
337. See supranote 289 and accompanying text.
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V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has explored an unusual kind of question: What does
the incorporation of the Excessive Bail Clause imply about its proper
construction? This sort of inquiry is uncommon because, when
incorporating other Bill of Rights provisions, the Supreme Court always
has explained the core protections involved.338 A previous or at least
simultaneous explanation of the protections is essential to demonstrate
why a clause meets the test of incorporation. 339 Nonetheless, the Court
incorporated the bail clause only by including it in a list of incorporated
provisions in a footnote in its opinion in McDonald v. City of
Chicago,34 ° where the question was whether to incorporate the Second
Amendment. 341 The Court offered no explanation about why the bail
clause met the test of incorporation.342 There also had been little
previous explanation from the Court about what core protections the bail
clause conferred.343
Before McDonald, there was good reason to doubt that the bail
clause, as interpreted by the Court, would guarantee any rights that were
important enough to warrant incorporation. The core uncertainties
centered on whether the clause conferred rights to bail and to nonexcessiveness that existed apart from legislative direction. What little the
Court had said did not encourage the notion that the provision gave
much protection. In upholding preventive detention many years earlier in
United States v. Salerno, 44 the Court had suggested that the clause
might only mean that a judicial officer, when deciding between
preventive detention and bail, should follow legislation about when bail
was permissible 345 and, when setting a bail amount, should follow
legislation about what purposes bail should serve.346 On this view, the
338. See supranote 149 and accompanying text.
339. That test is whether the rights protected are "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty
and system of justice." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010); see supra text
accompanying notes 136-40.
340. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
341. See supratext accompanying notes 136-40.
342. See supranote 134 and accompanying text.
343. As for the Second Amendment, the Court spent many pages in its McDonald opinion
explaining why that provision met the test of incorporation. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758-91.
Also, the Court previously had explained at length the nature of the protection provided by the
Second Amendment. Two years earlier, in Districtof Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the
Court had discussed in detail why the Second Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms
for purposes of self-defense that was violated by a law that banned the possession of handguns in
the home. See 554 U.S. at 573-636.
344. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
345. See supratext accompanying notes 47-50, 115-19.
346. See supratext accompanying note 49; supraPart Il.C.
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clause was only a directive to judicial officers to respect the separation
of powers by honoring bail legislation. This interpretation would render
the protection of little importance when applied in federal cases and
perversely frivolous when applied to the states.347 It would mean that
state courts should honor state bail legislation on which the final arbiters
would be state courts.348
The oddity of the Court's action in McDonald in declaring the bail
clause incorporated in a footnote without explanation does not inspire
confidence that the Justices had reached a momentous civil-rights
decision. Yet, the alternative explanations are much more disconcerting.
Could some or all five of the majority Justices in McDonald (and their
clerks) have erred, believing that the Court previously had incorporated
the clause when it never had done so? While Justices are fallible,
someone would likely have noted this mistake before publication of the
opinion. Could some of the Justices have supported incorporation
precisely because they believed that it would impose no serious demands
on the states? This is a disturbing notion, because it assumes that those
Justices would also circumvent the requirement for incorporation that a
clause grant fundamentally important protections. In the end, there is no
explanation for what the Court did with the bail clause in McDonaldthat
puts the Justices in a glowing light. Observers are left to choose between
trusting that the Court knew what it was doing and will at least stay true
to the implications in the future or concluding that the Court warrants
our cynicism.
I have assumed that the McDonald Court incorporated the bail
clause knowingly, and that the Justices are prepared to interpret the
rights incorporated as fundamentally important for protecting liberty and
justice. From this perspective, I have urged some basic propositions
about the proper construction of the clause. First, I have contended that it
must be more than a mere directive to courts to honor bail legislation.3 49
The Court should construct the clause to grant a right to bail in broad
circumstances and to define the proper function of bail and, thus, the
measure of excessiveness. These rulings should govern both courts and

347. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.
348. There could be some additional cases in which a federal court would find a state actor
involved in setting a high bail to have acted so unreasonably as to violate due process. See, e.g.,
Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 211-13 (1st Cir. 1987). However, such cases should come out
the same way even if there were no Excessive Bail Clause or even if it had not been incorporated
against the states. See Wiseman, supra note 5, at 1390 (noting that the clause becomes a
"constitutional nullity" if it does not require more than what the Due Process Clause already would
require).
349. See supraPart H.F.
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legislatures. Absent this basic understanding, the clause accomplishes
nothing worthy of incorporation.
I have also contended that incorporation calls for the Court to
resolve two additional questions about the clause that it otherwise could
likely have avoided. 350 The issues concern the nature of the evidence that
trial courts should consider in deciding bail questions and the standard
that reviewing courts should apply in passing on the decisions of trial
courts setting bond.351 On the first question, I have urged that
individualized consideration of the character, record, and crime of an
arrestee should generally inform bail decisions, which weighs against
over-reliance on bail schedules. 352 On the second question, I have argued
that the standard of review generally should ask whether a chosen bail
amount is "substantially more burdensome than necessary" to reasonably
assure the reappearance of the defendant.3 53 These conclusions balance
the fundamental importance of the bail clause in safeguarding liberty and
justice against several competing interests of government.
Finally, I have argued that incorporation calls for rethinking the
justiciability of excessive-bail claims on review of criminal convictions
after trial.354 The prevailing view apparently is that the rights to bail and
non-excessiveness are purely substantive.355 Denial is thought not to
affect the validity of the trial.356 Based on this view and the notion that
the rights end at the point of conviction, few cases requiring
interpretation of the Excessive Bail Clause survive for presentation to the
Supreme Court.357 I contend, however, that the rights are not only
substantive but procedural, because improper pretrial detention can
prejudice the defendant at trial.358 Recognizing the procedural side of the
protections would acknowledge the full significance of unlawful
detention for arrestees and enable the Court to receive more cases
through which it could construct and enforce a fundamentally important
provision in the Bill of Rights.

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

See supra Part HI.
See supra Part HI.
See supra Part M.A.
Wiseman, supranote 5, at 1350; see supra Part
See supra Part I.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part W.A.
See supra Part W.A.
See supra Part W.B.
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